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 1969 
A STATE-LEVEL RESPONSE TO 
INEFFECTIVE FEDERAL PLACE-BASED 
INVESTMENT TAX INCENTIVES 
Abstract: Using tax expenditures, the federal government can deploy economic 
incentives to alter our choices in the service of public policy goals. Doing so reduc-
es not only federal but also state tax revenue because state tax law often conforms 
to definitions of income contained in the Internal Revenue Code. State govern-
ments, however, may not have the same goals as Congress, so tax incentives im-
plemented nationally may not always be a good fit for states. This Note focuses on 
tax expenditures directing private investments into low-income neighborhoods, 
known as federal place-based investment tax incentives. It argues that because their 
impact is ambiguous at best, state governments should scrutinize such incentives 
and decouple state tax law from these provisions when they hurt the local commu-
nities they purport to help. This Note then proposes a framework to assist states in 
evaluating the local impact of federal place-based investment tax incentives. The 
framework asks three questions: 1) whether the federal provisions allow states to 
measure their effects; 2) whether states have the administrative capabilities to es-
tablish rigorous evaluation procedures; and 3) whether measures are in place to 
minimize the costs of these incentives while promoting the equitable distribution of 
their benefits. 
INTRODUCTION 
Taxation is a revenue-raising tool without which the U.S. government 
could not conduct the business of governing. 1 Satisfying the need for revenue 
is, however, only part of the story.2 In addition to direct spending and regula-
tions, Congress also provides tax breaks—known in policy circles as “tax ex-
                                                                                                          
 1 C. EUGENE STEUERLE, CONTEMPORARY U.S. TAX POLICY 15 (Jeffrey Butts et al. eds., 2004). 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes famously called taxes the price “we pay for a civilized society.” Com-
pania General de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 275 U.S. 87, 100 (19 27)  
(Holmes, J., dissenting). In the early days after the Revolutionary War, under the Articles of Confed-
eration, the inability to collect taxes forced the federal government to depend on financial donations 
from states. Mystica M. Alexander & Timothy Gagnon, The Roberts Court: Using the Taxing Power 
to Shape Individual Behavior, 23 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 345, 346–47 (2012). By 1783, this sys-
tem of taxation proved untenable in the face of mounting debts incurred during the Revolutionary 
War. Calvin H. Johnson, The Panda’s Thumb: The Modest and Mercantilist Meaning of the Com-
merce Clause, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 11 (2004). Although the members of the 1787 Consti-
tutional Convention disagreed on many issues, they agreed unanimously to grant Congress the “Power 
to Lay and collect Taxes.” Alexander & Gagnon, supra, at 347; see also U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1 
(granting Congress taxation power). 
 2 See STEUERLE, supra note 1, at 1 (describing taxation’s role in supporting government spending 
as the “ tip of the iceberg”). 
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penditures”—to encourage particular behaviors and activities. 3 Tax expendi-
tures change behavior by changing economic incentives. 4 When the United 
States faced an affordable housing shortage in the 1980s, Congress enacted the 
Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) under the Tax Reform Act of 1986 
to induce private actors into building more low-income housing, especially in 
poor neighborhoods. 5 Congress reasoned, and hoped, that real estate develop-
ers would be more inclined to build affordable housing if tax credits offset the 
cost of construction. 6 Now, the LIHTC far exceeds any other federal initiative 
in providing housing for low-income families, and it is entirely administered 
through the tax system. 7 Indeed, trillions of dollars of foregone tax revenue go 
                                                                                                          
 3 Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A Compar-
ison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705, 711 (1970); see Ruth Mason , 
Federalism and the Taxing Power, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 975, 981 (2011) (discussing how Congress uses 
taxing and spending decisions to regulate behavior). Tax scholarship credits this concept to Stanley 
Surrey’s seminal critique of tax expenditures published in the 1970s. Susannah Camic Tahk, Every-
thing Is Tax: Evaluating the Structural Transformation of U.S. Policymaking, 50 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 
67, 68 (2013); see Surrey, supra, at 734–38 (arguing that tax expenditures are generally flawed and 
less effective than direct expenditures). 
 4 Mason, supra note 3, at 981; c.f. OFF. OF TAX ANALYSTS, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, TAX EX-
PENDITURES 1 (2020) [hereinafter TAX EXPENDITURES] (explaining that the repeal of a tax expendi-
ture influences economic behavior by changing incentives). One simple illustration of a tax expendi-
ture considers the alternative motor vehicle tax credit. See Tahk, supra note 3, at 70 (discussing how 
the government increasingly turns to tax incentives to further energy policy objectives in lieu of estab-
lishing new regulatory agencies and direct spending). Tax credits offsetting the purchase price may tempt 
more consumers to buy a fuel-efficient car. Id. With that in mind, Congress included the alternative mo-
tor vehicle tax credit when it passed energy policy legislation in 2005. See I.R.C. § 30B(a)(1), (b)(1)(D) 
(providing up to $40,000 in “new qualified fuel cell motor vehicle” credits); Energy Policy Act of  
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (describing the purpose of the Act). Tax expenditures pursu-
ing this and other energy policies now exceed the entire budget of the Department of Environment and 
Energy. Compare TAX EXPENDITURES, supra, at tbl.1 (estimating energy tax expenditures as totaling 
approximately $14.3 billion for 2019), with MARK FEBRIZIO ET AL., REGULATORS’ BUDGET: HOME-
LAND SECURITY REMAINS KEY ADMINISTRATION PRIORITY 4 (2019) (estimating the budget for the 
Department of Environment and Energy as totaling approximately $8.3 billion in 2019). Other areas 
where the federal government employs tax expenditures include national defense; international affairs; 
research and development in science, space, and technology; energy production and consumption; 
conservation of natural resources and the environment; agriculture; commerce and housing; transpor-
tation; education; training, employment, and social services; health; income security; social security; 
veteran affairs; bond markets; and aid to state and local governments. TAX EXPENDITURES, supra. 
 5 See Rebecca Diamond & Tim McQuade, Who Wants Affordable Housing in their Backyard? An 
Equilibrium Analysis of Low-Income Property Development, 127 J. POL. ECON. 1063, 1064 (2019) 
(noting that housing subsidies induce changes in housing construction); Myron Orfield, Racial Inte-
gration and Community Revitalization: Applying the Fair Housing Act to the Low-Income Housing 
Tax Credit, 58 VAND. L. REV. 101, 131 (2005) (discussing the history of the Low-Income Housing 
Tax Credit (LIHTC)). 
 6 See Diamond & McQuade, supra note 5, at 1064 (discussing the incentive effect of housing 
subsidies on private actors). 
 7 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-637, LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT: IM-
PROVED DATA AND OVERSIGHT WOULD STRENGTHEN COST ASSESSMENT AND FRAUD RISK MAN-
AGEMENT 1 (2014) [hereinafter GAO-18-637]. In 2017, the LIHTC represented $8.4 billion in forgone 
tax revenue. Id. 
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towards nudging taxpayers to modify their behavior in a way that serves goals 
in the purview of federal agencies outside of the Department of the Treasury 
(Treasury).8 
When Congress uses its taxation power to regulate behavior, it not only 
makes decisions for the federal government but also for the states—without 
their consent. 9 Because states with an income tax often tax their residents us-
ing figures from federal tax returns, Congress reduces state tax revenue when 
providing federal tax breaks. 10 It often passes these measures to regulate activi-
ties historically under state control. 11 Being that federal tax expenditures re-
flect national priorities, states should pause to consider the effects of such ex-
penditures on not only their budgets but also on their autonomy to set state tax 
policy. 12 
                                                                                                          
 8 See Mason, supra note 3, at 985–87 (explaining that the federal government uses tax expendi-
tures to regulate a range of activities); c.f. David M. Schizer, Limiting Tax Expenditures, 68 TAX L. 
REV. 275, 275 (2015) (noting that the federal government reserves trillions of dollars for goals other 
than raising revenue). For example, in 2020, the government set aside about $214.4 billion to subsi-
dize taxpayers purchasing medical insurance through an employer; $83.5 billion for those contributing 
to a 401(k), and $75.7 billion for those raising children. TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 4, at tbl.1. 
Congress also regulates behavior using tax penalties, but does so to a lesser degree. Mason, supra note 
3, at 981. Companies cannot, for instance, deduct the fines they incur. Id.; see also I.R.C. § 162(f) 
(providing that certain fines and penalties are not eligible for deductions). The United States Depart-
ment of Treasury (“Treasury”) heads the Internal Revenue Service (IRS or “Service”) along wit h  
several other sub-agencies, including the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau, the Customs 
Service, and the United States Mint, and is responsible for “promoting economic prosperity and ensur-
ing the soundness and security of the U.S. and international financial systems.” Treasury Department, 
FED. REG., https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/treasury-department [https://perma.cc/DD4X-
P5QK] (describing Treasury’s purpose and its various sub-agencies). 
 9 See Heather M. Field, Binding Choices: Tax Elections & Federal/State Conformity, 32 VA. TAX 
REV. 527, 540–41 (2013) (explaining that changes in federal tax law result  in loss in state revenue 
even without action from state legislatures in states with rolling conformity to the most recent version 
of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC or “Code”)); Ruth Mason, Delegating Up: State Conformity with 
the Federal Tax Base, 62 DUKE L.J. 1267, 1289–94, 1303 (2013) (describing the impact of federal tax 
expenditures on state tax revenue). 
 10 See Mason, supra note 9, at 1269 (noting that the amount of state revenue from income tax 
mirrors changes to the federal tax base); Surrey, supra note 3, at 711 (explaining that Congress reduc-
es the tax base when passing tax expenditures). 
 11 Mason, supra note 3, at 985. One example of this “stealth preemption” has Congress exerting 
ever greater control over non-profit entities through its ability to grant federal tax-exempt status. See 
id. (discussing Professor James Fishman’s argument that the federal government is intruding on state 
regulation of charities); see also James J. Fishman, Stealth Preemption: The IRS’s Nonprofit Corpo-
rate Governance Initiative, 29 VA. TAX. REV. 545, 558 (2010) (explaining that the tax-exempt rules 
for non-profits contained in section 501(c)(3) of the Code mandate corporate governance practices). 
For example, the IRS questions applicants on topics like their compensation practices and processes to 
identify conflicts of interests. Fishman, supra, at 560. Arguably, such demands intrude on a traditional 
area of state interest over which states are in a better position to exert regulatory control. Id. at 586. 
 12 See Field, supra note 9, at 541–42 (discussing how states sacrifice sovereignty when conform-
ing to federal tax law); Mason, supra note 9, at 1293 (noting that by adopting federal tax law, states 
subsidize the activities Congress chooses to subsidize). For example, consider the federal mortgage 
interest deduction. See Mason, supra note 9, at 1303 (using the federal mortgage interest deduction to 
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This Note argues that federal place-based investment tax incentives de-
serve special scrutiny before state-level adoption. 13 Even though Congress in-
tends these incentives to improve economic conditions at the community level, 
their provisions apply uniformly without regard to the mix of contributors to 
poverty and unemployment that vary by region and state. 14 The first federal 
tax expenditure of this kind came in the form of the LIHTC in 1986, whereby 
investors received a tax credit so long as they invested in low-income housing 
construction in high-poverty areas. 15 Subsequent provisions expanded the use 
of federal place-based investment tax incentives and imposed fewer re-
strictions on the types of projects eligible for investment. 16 The impetus driv-
ing the federal government to enact this type of tax incentive is the belief that 
market-based initiatives are better at spurring community development than 
direct government interventions. 17 Investors receive the tax breaks, but the 
economic benefits trickle down to community residents by providing more 
employment opportunities, higher wages, and a better quality of life. 18 The 
evidence, however, is decidedly mixed. 19 Because the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice (IRS or Service) does little in the way of collecting data on tax expendi-
                                                                                                          
illustrate the impact of federal tax expenditures on a state’s ability to adjust tax incentives to better fit 
local needs). Coastal states have a tighter housing market than states in the Midwest. Id. Taxpayers 
across the United States, however, qualify for the same federal mortgage interest rate deduction no 
matter where they buy a home. Id. If their state follows federal income tax calculations, they will  
receive a similar reduction to their state tax bill. See id. at  1269 (explaining the effect of state con-
formity with federal tax law). Sacrificing state tax revenue to subsidize homeownership may, for in-
stance, make more sense in Montana, the least densely populated state with an income tax, than in 
California where housing demand far outstrips supply. See FED’N OF TAX ADM’RS, STATE PERSONAL 
INCOME TAXES: FEDERAL STARTING POINTS 1 (2020) (providing tax regime by state with Alaska and 
Wyoming as states with no income tax); LEGIS. ANALYST’S OFF. OF THE CAL. LEGISLATURE’S NON-
PARTISAN FISCAL & POL’Y ADVISOR, CALIFORNIA’S HIGH HOUSING COSTS 10 (2015) (explaining 
that the high demand relative to supply of housing in California is the cause of high home prices); 
U.S. DEP’T OF COM. ET AL., UNITED STATES SUMMARY: 2010, POPULATION AND HOUSING COUNTS 
41 (2012) (listing Montana behind Alaska and Wyoming as the least densely populated state. 
 13 See infra notes 102–150 and accompanying text (providing a critical assessment of federal 
place-based investment tax incentives). 
 14 See Mason, supra note 9, at 1303 (arguing that conformity decreases states’ ability to adjust 
incentives to account for regional differences); infra notes 206–214 and accompanying text (arguing 
that states should evaluate federal place-based tax policies before deciding to enact the provisions in 
the state tax code). 
 15 I.R.C. § 42; see Orfield, supra note 5, at 131 (discussing the impetus for Congress to pass the 
LIHTC program). 
 16 See I.R.C. §§ 45D, 1400Z-1 to -2 (providing no limitations on the types of projects eligible for 
the New Markets Tax Credit (NMTC) program or for Opportunity Zone tax incentives contained in 
the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA)). 
 17 Michelle D. Layser, The Pro-Gentrification Origins of Place-Based Investment Tax Incentives 
and a Path Toward Community Oriented Reform, 2019 WIS. L. REV. 745, 778. 
 18 Id. 
 19 David Neumark & Helen Simpson, Place-Based Policies, in 5B HANDBOOK ON REGIONAL 
AND URBAN ECONOMICS 1197, 1279 (2015). 
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ture schemes, we do not know the true effects of interventions of this kind.20 
Where the information exists, an uneven track record emerges.21 Whether these 
tax breaks improve the economic well-being of residents in targeted communi-
ties is uncertain. 22 Critics have also accused these incentives of exacerbating 
social ills like racial segregation and gentrification. 23 
Yet, Congress continues to renew old and enact new place-based invest-
ment tax incentives. 24 The 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA), for example, 
includes a new provision permitting individuals to avoid paying taxes on prof-
its from the sale of capital assets when invested in low-income areas known as 
“Opportunity Zones.”25 With an estimated cost of $1.6 billion to the federal 
government over a decade, the program’s ultimate budgetary impact remains 
largely unknown. 26 As a result, whether the expenditure will exact a high price 
from state budgets is murky, as is whether the incentive will yield better results 
than past place-based tax initiatives. 27 
The question thus becomes how state legislatures should respond when 
Congress passes new place-based investment tax expenditures.28 One approach 
would be to simply stop importing federal calculations of taxable income. 29 
Doing so, however, would mean that states would not be able to leverage the 
                                                                                                          
 20 STEUERLE, supra note 1, at 198, 206. 
 21 See infra notes 106–125 and accompanying text (assessing outcomes from federal place-based 
investment tax incentives). 
 22 See, e.g., Richard C. Hula & Marty P. Jordan, Private Investment and Public Redevelopment: 
The Case of New Markets Tax Credits, 10 POVERTY & PUB. POL’Y 11, 26 (2018) (noting that studies 
have not shown that the NMTC substantially enhances the lives of residents in targeted communities). 
 23 See, e.g., Michelle D. Layser, How Federal Tax Law Rewards Housing Segregation, 98 IND. 
L.J. 915, 948–49 (2018) (arguing that the design of the LIHTC exacerbated the segregation of low-
income communities). 
 24 See I.R.C. § 1400Z-1 to -2 (providing for a place-based tax incentive passed in 2017). 
 25 Id. 
 26 See JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, JCX-67-17, ESTIMATED BUDGET EFFECTS OF THE CONFERENCE 
AGREEMENT FOR H.R. 1, THE “TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT” 6 (Comm. Print 2017) [hereinafter JCX-
67-17] (estimating the cost of creating Opportunity Zones); see also SCOTT EASTMAN & NICOL E 
KAEDING, OPPORTUNITY ZONES: WHAT WE KNOW AND WHAT WE DON’T 7 (2019) (asserting that 
because, on the one hand government projections extend only to 2027, and on the other hand Treasury 
regulations phase out benefits more than two decades later, it  is impossible to know the program’s 
final budgetary impact). 
 27 See Mason, supra note 9, at 1289 (describing the effect of federal tax expenditures on state 
budgets); Neumark & Simpson, supra note 19, at 1279 (arguing that the outcomes from place-based 
tax policies present ambiguous results). 
 28 See Mason, supra note 9, at 1270–71 (arguing that the impact of federal-state tax base con-
formity deserves closer assessment). Generally, federal-state tax base conformity is an issue of con-
cern because first , proceeds from income tax make up an increasingly higher proportion of a state’s 
tax base; second, Congress has shown expanding preference to regulate behaviors using the federal 
tax code; and third, the growing bi-partisan divide will likely mean that states policy goals will in-
creasingly diverge from national policy choices. Id. 
 29 Id. at  1278. States have sovereign power to define their tax base and can choose to abandon 
federal definitions of income at will. 71 AM. JUR. 2D State & Local Taxation § 56, Westlaw (database 
updated Feb. 2021); Mason, supra note 9, at 1271. 
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Service’s extensive rulemaking expertise and enforcement capabilities. 30 De-
coupling from the federal tax base would also make filing taxes more onerous 
for taxpayers. 31 
This Note advocates for an alternative approach—one that retains con-
formity with federal definitions of income but evaluates these provisions for fit 
when importing them into the state tax code. 32 It proposes a framework for  
states to assess whether federal place-based investment tax incentives are 
compatible with state objectives. 33 Factors considered in the framework fall 
into three categories. 34 The first examines the structure of the provision itself 
and asks whether its design allows states to measure its performance. 35 The 
second considers the types of structural processes necessary to conduct ongo-
ing monitoring and evaluation of the intervention’s outcomes.36 The third ex-
amines whether the incentive aligns with principles of sound tax policy such 
that it nets an overall benefit to society, while distributing those benefits equi-
tably. 37 
Part I of this Note provides a primer on federal place-based investment 
tax incentives enacted to date and outlines their key critiques. 38 Part II  de-
scribes how federally-enacted place-based policies impact states. 39 Part III 
concludes by offering a framework to assist state legislatures in deciding 
whether to import such provisions into their tax codes.40 
                                                                                                          
 30 Mason, supra note 9, at 1280. For example, when states conform to federal definitions of in-
come, they can exchange information with the federal government to ensure taxpayers have paid their 
share in taxes. Id. at 1280–81. 
 31 Id. 
 32 See infra notes 206–214 and accompanying text (arguing that states can retain the benefits of 
conformity while evaluating whether federal place-based investment tax incentives are a good fit for 
their communities). 
 33 See infra notes 221–264 and accompanying text (proposing three categories of factors states 
should consider when confronted with new federal place-based investment tax incentives). 
 34 See infra notes 221–264 and accompanying text (same). 
 35 See infra notes 221–235 and accompanying text (describing an approach to evaluate the fea-
tures of a federal place-based investment tax incentive). 
 36 See infra notes 236–253 and accompanying text (discussing state-specific factors when consid-
ering compatibility of a federal place-based investment tax incentive). 
 37 See infra notes 254–264 and accompanying text (considering tax policy principles of efficiency 
and equity as applied to place-based investment tax incentives). 
 38 See infra notes 41–150 and accompanying text (describing the LIHTC, the NMTC, and the 
Opportunity Zone tax incentives and their effects on racial segregation, gentrification, as well as their 
uneven economic track record). 
 39 See infra notes 151–205 and accompanying text (explaining the concept of tax expenditures 
and federal and state tax base conformity). 
 40 See infra notes 206–264 and accompanying text (discussing fixed and dynamic conformity 
with federal tax law and proposing a framework to evaluate newly enacted federal place-based in-
vestment tax incentives). 
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I. FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES AS A COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT TOOL 
Governments have a variety of ways to selectively tax income to regulate 
conduct. 41 Congress can provide taxpayers with exclusions, deferrals, deduc-
tions, and tax credits—all of which reduce the amount of taxes collec ted. 42 
These policy levers are known as tax expenditures, and they use economic in-
centives to encourage what Congress believes are behaviors and activities ben-
eficial to national welfare. 43 Starting from the mid-1980s—drawn to the prom-
                                                                                                          
 41 See ROBERT S. SMITH & ADELE T. SMITH, WEST’S TAX LAW DICTIONARY § T615 (201 9) 
(defining tax incentive). Earnings earned from labor and capital is income, but not all income is taxa-
ble. Id. § I320. 
 42 See Surrey, supra note 3, at 706–07, 711–12 (defining tax expenditures and their goals). Com-
puting income tax liability begins with the taxpayer’s gross income, defined in the Code as all income 
irrespective of its source. I.R.C. § 61(a). Gross income includes, for example, wages, business income, 
gains from the sale of property, dividends, interest, and capital gains. Id. An exclusion allows fo r  
certain items of “income” otherwise within the meaning of the Code to be omitted from the definition 
of gross income. See id. § 61(b) (cross-referencing to items specifically excluded from gross income). 
From gross income, taxpayers subtract certain “above-the-line” deductions to arrive at federal Adjust-
ed Gross Income (AGI), and then, “below-the-line” deductions to calculate their federal “taxable in-
come.” Id. §§ 62–63; 33 AM. JUR. 2D Federal Taxation ¶ 1001, Westlaw (database updat ed Feb.  
2021). Several of these deductions are meant to avoid taxing income with value partly derived from 
dollars previously taxed, otherwise known as double taxation. See Theodore P. Seto &  San de L .  
Buhai, Tax and Disability: Ability to Pay and the Taxation of Difference, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1053, 
1077 (2006) (explaining comprehensive tax base theory); see, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 162, 167 (allowing de-
ductions for trade or business expenses and depreciation of property used in a trade or business or for 
the production of income). Other deductions aim to calibrate tax liability more closely to a taxpayer’s 
ability to pay. See Joel S. Newman, Of Taxes and Other Casualties, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 941, 943 (1983) 
(noting that, despite its conceptual flaws, gauging the “ability to pay” forms the theoretical foundation 
of our tax regime); see, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 165, 213 (providing for deductions for casualty losses and unre-
imbursed medical expenses); JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, JCS-10-87, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE 
T AX REFORM ACT OF 1986, at 50–51 (Comm. Print 1987) (explaining that the Tax Reform Act of 
1986 raises the medical expense deduction floor to 7.5% of a taxpayer’s AGI such that it provides 
relief only when the expense is so great as to affect a taxpayer’s ability to pay their income tax). To 
arrive closer to their total tax liability, taxpayers must multiply their taxable income by their applica-
ble tax rate, and that rate depends on the taxpayer’s status, as well as the type and amount of income. 
I.R.C. § 1; see 33 Federal Taxation, supra, ¶ 1004 (providing tax rates for calculating tax liability). 
Special tax rates apply to capital gains, income from farming, individuals with short tax years, and 
income of certain children. Federal Taxation, supra, ¶ 1001. Finally, taxpayers can reduce their total 
taxes due by subtracting qualifying tax credits. SMITH & SMITH, supra note 41, § T330. 
 43 Surrey, supra note 3, at 711. Certain deductions incentivize charitable giving and homeowner-
ship. See I.R.C. §§ 163(h), 170 (providing for deductions for mortgage interest payments and charita-
ble giving, respectively). For example, gross income for employees excludes the premiums employers 
pay for health and accident insurance, disability insurance, and life insurance. See id. §§ 9, 104(a)(3), 
105(a)–(b), 106 (provisions excluding employer-paid life, health, accident, and disability insurance). 
These exclusions effectively increase the value employees derive from their job without an accompa-
nying increase in taxable income. See STEUERLE, supra note 1, at 40 (explaining the effects of exclu-
sions from gross income and noting that exclusions accounted for 15% of personal income in 2000). 
They encourage employers to offer benefits arguably constituting a sort of private-sector social safety 
net. See William P. Kratzke, The (Im)balance of Externalities in Employment-based Exclusions from 
Gross Income, 60 TAX LAW. 1, 1 (2006) (arguing that such exclusions shape the employment rela-
tionship and generate inefficiencies that outweigh the public policy benefits). To illustrate a deferral, 
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ise of a market-driven solution to deliver benefits to low-income communities 
requiring minimal government intervention—the federal government turned to 
tax expenditures as a solution to endemic poverty. 44 Section A of this Part pro-
vides a history of federal place-based investment tax incentives Congress has 
passed to date. 45 Section B assesses the impact of such interventions on low-
income communities. 46 
A. History of Federal Place-based Investment Tax Incentives 
Investment tax incentives are a kind of tax expenditure designed to influ-
ence taxpayer decisions on how to allocate funds, alongside the expectation of 
achieving a profit. 47 Provisions in the tax code are place-based when geogra-
phy determines how those provisions apply to taxpayers. 48 Place-based in-
vestment tax incentives subsidize the cost of investment activity in spec if ic  
                                                                                                          
consider interest income from qualified retirement and education savings accounts. See I.R.C. § 401 
(providing for qualified pension, profit-sharing, and stock bonus plans); id.§ 529 (providing for quali-
fied tuition programs). Here, taxpayers only pay taxes when they withdraw funds from accounts in-
stead of the year when the interest accrued. BORIS BITTKER ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF 
INDIVIDUALS 40-38, 40-44 (3d ed. 2002). In this case, taxpayers defer recognition of income, meaning 
taxpayers may have earned income during one taxable period but do not report the income on their tax 
return until some point later in time. Id. at  28-4. Taxpayers may realize income, but the I.R.S. decides 
when to recognize the income as taxable. Id. at 28-5. Although they will eventually owe taxes, they 
derive additional tax-free interest income so long as their money remains in qualified savings ac-
counts. Id. In addition, deferring the payment of a tax liability reduces the amount owed because of 
the time value of money. BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, 
ESTATES AND GIFTS ¶ 28.1 (West 2021). The time value of money posits that cash in hand has more 
value than the same amount of cash if an individual received it at a later time, because that person can 
invest cash in hand and earn interest in the interim. Time Value of Money, OXFORD DICTIONARY OF 
FINANCE & BANKING (6th ed. 2018). By the same token, money the person pays at a later date has 
less value than the same amount of money if the person pays it now. Id. All of these benefits should 
motivate economically rational taxpayers to save money for retirement or for education. STEUERLE, 
supra note 1, at 62; see, e.g., I.R.C. § 219 (providing deductions for qualified retirement contribu-
tions). Individuals can engage in further tax arbitrage by borrowing interest-deductible mortgage loans 
and direct cashflow to savings vehicles whose interest income is exempt from taxation. STEUERLE, 
supra note 1, at 62. 
 44 See Layser, supra note 17, at 778 (discussing the origins of federal place-based tax incentives). 
 45 See infra notes 47–101 and accompanying text (considering the implications of state conformi-
ty with federal tax law). 
 46 See infra notes 102–150 and accompanying text (examining the design of federal place-based 
investment tax incentives Congress has enacted to date). 
 47 See Surrey, supra note 3, at 711 (explaining the objectives of investment tax incentives). 
 48 Daniel J. Hemel, A Place for Place in Federal Tax Law, 45 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 525, 526 (2019) 
(defining place-based rules as those that result in different tax burdens based on a taxpayer’s place of 
residency, location of property, or locus of activity). Federal tax law rarely provides tax breaks based 
solely on whether a taxpayer carries out an activity in a particular place. See id. at 527 (finding spatial 
distinctions in federal U.S. taxation to be rare). Prominent examples include a variety of tax rules 
applying solely to U.S. taxpayers living abroad, as well as Code provisions exempting residents of 
unincorporated U.S. territories, such as Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, from taxation o n  
personal income earned within those territories. Id. at 528.  
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locations, mainly high-poverty areas or regions where the area median income 
is low relative to the cost of construction, land, and utilities. 49 First proposed in 
the United States in the late 1970s, these incentives operated under the as-
sumption that governments could target distressed neighborhoods for econom-
ic development by extending tax benefits to businesses willing to relocate to 
those areas. 50 Original proponents of place-based investment tax incentives  
theorized that urban decline inevitably resulted from people and businesses  
abandoning cities for the suburbs. 51 To tackle the problem, policymakers since 
the 1980s have focused on private development and local entrepreneurship as 
an anti-poverty solution. 52 In particular, three of the four federal place-based 
                                                                                                          
 49 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 42(d)(5)(B) (defining qualified census tracts and difficult development areas 
eligible for LIHTC). 
 50 Jeffrey M. Euston, Clinton’s Empowerment Zones: Hope for the Cities or a Failing Enter-
prise?, 3 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 140, 141 (1994) (discussing the development of enterprise zones). 
Such initiatives initially took the form of enterprise zones. Layser, supra note 17, at 778. A British 
academic, University of Reading Professor Peter Hall, first conceived of tax incentives as part of an 
overall package to revive, what he called, “enterprise zones.” Euston, supra, at 141. Use of enterprise 
zones as a policy tool gained a foothold in the English-speaking world in 1980 when newly-elected 
prime minister, Margaret Thatcher, enacted legislation that sought to jump-start activity in industrial 
centers, rather than revive distressed urban areas. Id. In the United States, the concept found a recep-
tive audience in a political landscape dominated by neoliberal ideology. See TIMOTHY P.R. WEAVER, 
BLAZING THE NEOLIBERAL TRAIL: URBAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES AND 
THE UNITED KINGDOM 29 (2016) (tracing the evolution of neoliberal ideology in urban development 
policies); Layser, supra note 17, at 778 (arguing that Reagan-era efforts to weaken the regulatory state 
included not only cuts to federal spending, but the promotion of policies that allowed for minimal 
government intervention). Neoliberalists believe broadly that a freer and richer society results from a 
socio-economic system prioritizing the interests of financial capital and promoting property rights, 
open markets, and free trade. WEAVER, supra, at 11. Neoliberals rejected Keynesian interventions of 
the post-war New Deal era and instead advocated for tax cuts, privatization of public services, reduc-
tions in redistributive welfare, and anti-union policies. Id. 
 51 See WEAVER, supra note 50, at 35–36 (discussing the diagnosis posited by Stuart Butler, a  
policy analyst credited for seeding the idea of enterprise zones in the United States in a report pub-
lished in 1979 under the aegis of the Heritage Foundation). The hypothesis is that such losses deliver a 
one-two punch to city finances: a shrinking tax base and increased costs to maintain and police aban-
doned areas. STUART M. BUTLER, ENTERPRISE ZONES: GREENLINING THE INNER CITIES 45 (1981). 
 52 Michelle D. Layser, A Typology of Place-Based Investment Tax Incentives, 25 WASH. & LEE J. 
C.R. & SOC. JUST. 403, 405 (2019); see also Tax Incentives Targeted to Distressed Areas: Hearing 
Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 98th Cong. 33 (1983) (statement of Congressman E. de la 
Garza from Texas noting the importance of access to capital for small businesses) [hereinafter Hear-
ing]; Stuart M. Butler, ‘Supply Side’ in the Inner City Enterprise Zones in America, 7 BUILT ENV’T 
42, 46 (1981) (noting that access to capital was often the major obstacle for small firms). When first 
proposed and packaged as a key feature in enterprise zone programs, place-based investment tax in-
centives were not urban renewal initiatives. Peter Hall, Enterprise Zones: British Origins, American 
Adaptations, 7 BUILT ENV’T 4, 6 (1981). As originally intended, enterprise zones would occupy run-
down areas with few, if any, inhabitants, effectively creating industrial parks outside residential areas. 
Euston, supra note 50, at 141; Hall, supra, at 6. Even as the goal for place-based incentives shifted 
from industrial development to community revitalization, policymakers continued to stress the role of 
small business entrepreneurship, as well as real estate development to address affordable housin g 
needs. See, e.g., Hearing, supra, at 40 (statement of Congressman Jack E. Kemp claiming that enter-
prise zone tax incentives were uniquely placed to target small businesses most likely to provide jobs 
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investment tax incentives enacted to date exhibit a preference for taxpayers  
willing to invest in projects and businesses operating in distressed areas. 53 
Contrast these indirect subsidies with the tax incentives the federal government 
provides directly to business owners located in state “enterprise zones” or fed-
erally-enacted “empowerment zones.”54 Indirect investment tax incentives ,  
instead, subsidize taxpayers who invest capital in local businesses.55 This Note 
focuses on this type of place-based policy because, for the past two decades, 
Congress has favored indirect investment tax incentives to pursue its commu-
nity development goals. 56 
Supporters of indirect investment tax incentives believe that investors are 
generally less willing to provide capital to projects located in low-income 
communities because they expect higher risk and a lower rate of return. 57 
Without adequate equity investment, institutional lenders are, in turn, less will-
ing to provide loans to these businesses. 58 Therefore, by subsidizing the cost of 
providing capital to local businesses, preferential tax treatment for investors 
increases the likelihood that local businesses can attract sufficient w orking 
capital. 59 Indeed, during the early stages of growth, providing tax benefits di-
                                                                                                          
in low-income areas). Fostering local start-ups was thought to create, rather than merely geographical-
ly reallocate, jobs and economic prosperity—a common critique of early enterprise zone initiatives in 
Britain. See, e.g., Butler, supra, at  44; Hall, supra, at 7. This argument is an extension of empirical 
studies showing that, at the time, small businesses created nearly two-thirds of net new jobs in Ameri-
ca. David Boeck, The Enterprise Zone Debate, 16 URB. LAW. 71, 78 (1984); see David L. Birch, Who 
Creates Jobs?, 65 PUB. INT. 1, 7 (1981) (showing that, at the time, more than two-thirds of new jobs 
created in the United States originated from businesses with twenty or fewer employees). 
 53 See Layser, supra note 52, at 443, 447 n.208 (comparing the characteristics of the following 
federal place-based investment tax incentives: the LIHTC, Empowerment Zone laws, the NMTC, and 
the TCJA 2017 Opportunity Zone initiative). 
 54 Compare I.R.C. §§ 1396, 1397C (providing tax credits to employers within qualified “empow-
erment zones” equal to 20% of employee wages), and COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-30-1 05.1 (20 20)  
(providing $1,100 of tax credits per year for each employee to employers who operates in a state en-
terprise zone), with I.R.C. §§ 1400Z-1 to -2 (providing deferrals and reductions in taxes owed o n  
capital gains if those capital gains are invested in Opportunity Zones). 
 55 Layser, supra note 52, at 417–18. Tax expenditure theory posits that when the tax code pro-
vides preferential treatment for certain activities, the government is using tax dollars to subsidize  
taxpayers much as if it had cut them a check directly. Id. at 412–14; see also Surrey, supra note 3, at 
715 (rejecting assertions that tax incentives are not government subsidies). 
 56 See Layser, supra note 52, at 447–52 (categorizing the LIHTC, NMTC, and Opportunity Zone 
program contained in the TCJA as indirect investment tax incentives); see infra notes 62–101 an d 
accompanying text (discussing the LIHTC, NMTC, and Opportunity Zone programs). 
 57 Layser, supra note 52, at 419 & n.69. Early proposals contained the complete elimination of 
the capital gains tax on investments within targeted zones and a 50% deduction for income and inter-
est on such investments. See Butler, supra note 52, at 47 (describing investment tax incentives con-
tained in the first bill introduced to Congress proposing enterprise zones). 
 58 Layser, supra note 52, at 417 & n.69. 
 59 Id. at  417; see Michael Livingston, Risky Business: Economics, Culture, and the Taxation of 
High-Risk Activities, 48 TAX L. REV. 163, 168 (1993) (noting one view of the relationship between 
taxation and investment risk-taking). Some lawmakers consider investment tax incentives to be more 
crucial than tax credits or reduced marginal rates. See, e.g., Hearing, supra note 52, at 3 (containing a 
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rectly to local business owners and project developers does little to decrease 
barriers to entry because these entities often have little income to offset. 60 
This Section examines the three place-based investment tax incentives  
enacted at the federal level from 1986 to the present day; Subsection One dis-
cusses the LIHTC, Subsection Two describes the New Markets Tax Credit 
(NMTC), and Subsection Three examines the Opportunity Zone program 
passed with the TCJA. 61 
1. The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit of 1986 
Congress first inserted an indirect place-based investment tax incentive into 
the Internal Revenue Code (IRC or Code) in 1986 as a response to an increased 
demand for affordable housing.62 Known as the LIHTC, the provision allows 
residential property developers to claim tax credits over ten years, covering up to 
70% of the costs to construct or renovate low-income housing units . 63 This  
amount can reach 91% in high-poverty census tracts or areas where there are 
high construction, land, and utility costs relative to median income.64 Projects 
qualify for credits only if developers set aside a fixed percentage of units for 
                                                                                                          
statement of Congressman E. de la Garza from Texas supporting a proposal that would allow expens-
ing enterprise zone investments). These ideas are consistent with supply-side economic theory, domi-
nant in the 1980s when Congress first proposed such incentives. See Butler, supra note 52, at 46 (de-
scribing the first lawmakers promoting tax relief for capital investments in enterprise zones as “sup-
ply-side” Republicans); Layser, supra note 17, at 778 (noting the receptive political environment in 
which place-based investment tax incentives first took root); see also Arthur B. Laffer, Supply-Side 
Economics, 37 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 29, 29 (1981) (arguing that tax cuts on capital lead to more invest-
ment, resulting in lower unemployment and higher wages). 
 60 Layser, supra note 52, at 417; see also Butler, supra note 52, at 46 (noting that small business-
es rarely consider income tax to be the major obstacle preventing them from launching or expanding 
operations). This Note does not discuss direct place-based investment tax incentives in detail, but they 
include most enterprise zone initiatives, like the one contained in the Economic Empowerment Act of 
1993. See Euston, supra note 50, at 145–46 (describing key initiatives in the Economic Empowerment 
Act of 1993). Businesses operating within designated areas could deduct up to $37,500 in investments 
in depreciable property during the first year. Id. By contrast, federal tax law, at the time, allowed busi-
nesses to write off only $10,000. Id. Those that hired zone residents additionally qualified for up to 
$3,000 in credits for the first  $15,000 in payroll expenses. Id. 
 61 See infra notes 62–101 and accompanying text (examining the LIHTC and the NMTC pro-
grams, as well as the Opportunity Zone scheme passed in the TCJA). 
 62 Orfield, supra note 5, at 131 (explaining the history of the LIHTC). Prior to the LIHTC, the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the Department of Agriculture adminis-
tered almost all federal housing subsidies at the time the Fair Housing Act (FHA) was passed in 1968. 
Id. at 130. A growing demand for affordable housing and a series of missteps involving HUD, howev-
er, prompted the federal government to find a mechanism to replace direct subsidies for the construc-
tion of low-income housing. Id. The LIHTC filled this void. Id. at 131. 
 63 I.R.C. § 42. A tax credit allows taxpayers to, after determining their total tax liability, subtract 
the credit amount from the total sum of taxes they owe. Tax Credit, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th 
ed. 2019). 
 64 I.R.C. § 42; Hemel, supra note 48, at 528–29 (explaining how Treasury calculates credit allo-
cations under LIHTC provisions). 
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low-income households for at least fifteen years.65 These units are also subject to 
a rent ceiling capped at 30% of the household’s income.66 
The LIHTC program remains the largest federal initiative supporting the 
construction of low-income housing.67 Treasury tasks states with allocating its 
annual quota of federal tax credits to private developers. 68 States have general-
ly funneled a large portion of their credits to developers operating in areas with 
sizable minority and low-income populations. 69 Because the tax credits often 
do not cover the entire cost of construction, developers require additional fund-
ing. 70 So, they effectively sell the credits to third parties in return for equity 
investment. 71 These investors contribute equity at the start of the project and 
receive the right to claim tax credits throughout the qualifying ten-year peri-
od. 72 Through this process of tax credit monetization, developers can access 
the full value of credits at the onset when a project requires the most capital 
investment even though Treasury allocates the tax credits from the LIHTC 
program over a decade. 73 
2. The New Markets Tax Credit of 2000 
In 2000, the Clinton administration signed into law the NMTC program 
as part of the Community Renewal Tax Relief Act. 74 The Community Devel-
                                                                                                          
 65 I.R.C. § 42(g). Twenty percent of units must be available to households with income at or be-
low 50% of the area’s median gross income, or alternatively, 40% of units must be available to house-
holds with income at or below 60% of the area’s median gross income. Id. § 42(g)(1)(C)(i)–(ii). De-
velopers can also choose to set aside 40% of units to households with income levels at 20%, 30%, 
40%, 50%, 60%, or 80% of the area’s median gross income, so long as average income is at or below 
60% of the area’s median gross income. Id. § 42(g)(1)(C)(ii)(III).  
 66 Id. § 42(g)(2). For example, if a unit is destined for a household with income at or below 60% 
of area median income, then rent is capped 18% of area median income because it cannot exceed 30% 
of the income limitation applicable to that unit. See id. (providing for limitations on rent charged for 
designated low-income units); Michael D. Eriksen & Stuart S. Rosenthal, Crowd Out Effects of Place-
Based Subsidized Rental Housing: New Evidence from the LIHTC Program, 94 J. PUB. ECON. 953, 
954 & n.8 (2010) (calculating rent caps as related to area median income). 
 67 Orfield, supra note 5, at 103. 
 68 I.R.C. § 42(h)(3)(C), (m). The federal government requires states to devise Qualified Alloca-
tion Plans that lay out the methodologies by which they select and award the credits. Brandon M.  
Weiss, Locating Affordable Housing: The Legal System’s Misallocation of Subsidized Housing Incen-
tives, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 215, 221 (2019).  
 69 Orfield, supra note 5, at 103. 
 70 Layser, supra note 52, at 420. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. at  423. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, app. G, § 1, 114  St at . 
2763A–587; see I.R.C. § 45D (providing for the NMTC); Hemel, supra note 48, at 530 (explaining 
the history of the NMTC). The NMTC was set to expire in 2019, but instead, Congress extended the 
program for another year at a $5 billion cost through 2020, as part of a spending package President 
Donald J. Trump signed into law on December 20, 2019. H.R. 1865, 116th Cong. (2019) (enacted as 
Further Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-94, 133 Stat. 2534). 
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opment Financial Institutions (CDFI) Fund, a division of the Treasury, admin-
isters the program and provides tax credits to Treasury-certified investment 
groups, known as Community Development Entities (CDE). 75 CDEs are for-
profit corporations or partnerships that offer tax credits to third-party taxpayers 
in exchange for capital investments. 76 CDEs then invest the capital in low -
income communities in the form of loans or equity investments.77 Communi-
ties eligible for these capital infusions must have a poverty rate of at least 20% 
or a median family income not exceeding 80% of the greater of either the 
statewide or the metropolitan median family income. 78 
The NMTC incentive structure intends to hold CDEs accountable in two 
ways: first, via its governance structure, by allocating board seats to communi-
ty members, and second, through an annual process in which CDEs must apply 
to Treasury and compete for a finite allocation of tax credits. 79 States can free-
ride the federal CDE certification process and allocate tax credits offsetting 
state tax liabilities for investments in CDEs operating locally. 80 Contrary to the 
LIHTC program, however, the Treasury makes all federal allocation decisions 
and distributes tax credits directly to CDEs without input from states . 81 To 
                                                                                                          
 75 See Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, app. D, 114 Stat. 2763 
(amending title III of Public Law 106-377 to grant NMTC administration to Treasury’s Community 
Development Financial Institutions (CDFI) Fund); Matthew Freedman, Teaching New Markets Old 
Tricks: The Effects of Subsidized Investment on Low-Income Neighborhoods, 96 J. PUB. POL’Y 1000, 
1001 (2012) (describing the mechanisms by which the CDFI Fund distributes tax credits). 
 76 I.R.C. § 45D(c)(1); see Layser, supra note 52, at 421–22 (describing the role of Community 
Development Entities (CDEs)). CDEs are typically financial institutions or affiliates of non-qualifying 
financial institutions. Laura Molloy, New Markets Tax Credits: A Success at Federal and State Levels, 
J. MULTISTATE TAX’N & INCENTIVES, Nov.–Dec. 2013, at 20, 22 (2013). 
 77 Layser, supra note 52, at 421–22. In their early years, from 2002 through 2009, CDEs funneled 
over two-thirds of all investment dollars into commercial real estate projects. Freedman, supra note 
75, at 1002. Only about half of a percent went to residential real estate. Id. 
 78 I.R.C. § 45D(e)(1). A number of low-population census tracts failing to meet these criteria also 
qualify. Freedman, supra note 75, at 1002. These areas are in Empowerment Zones, adjacent to quali-
fying low-income communities, and have populations of less than two thousand people. Id. Treasury 
also allows CDEs to provide capital to businesses outside of these areas so long as those businesses 
serve the targeted population. Id. These populations include low-income Native American popula-
tions, as well as those who have difficulty accessing loans and capital investments. Id. 
 79 Freedman, supra note 75, at 1001. The CDFI Fund is the administering entity and sits in Treas-
ury’s Office of Domestic Finance. Financial Institutions, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, https://home.
treasury.gov/about/offices/domestic-finance/financial-institutions [https://perma.cc/3A2M-8SB8] 
(describing functions of the Office of Domestic Finance). Between 2003 and 2017, the CDFI Fund 
completed fifteen rounds of allocations, awarding a total of $57.5 billion in tax credits. CMTY. DEV. 
FIN. INSTS. FUND, NEW MARKETS TAX CREDIT (NMTC) PUBLIC DATA RELEASE: FY 2003 TO FY 
2017 SUMMARY REPORT 1, 5 (2019), https://www.cdfifund.gov/sites/cdfi/files/documents/2019-nmtc-
public-data-release_fy_17-comments-incorporated_bl-edits-incorporated_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/
3BV3-TSAG]. 
 80 See Molloy, supra note 76, at 25 (describing state-level NMTC programs). 
 81 Freedman, supra note 75, at 1001. 
1982 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:1969 
date, eight states have leveraged the NMTC program and provide additional 
state tax credits to investors in CDEs. 82 
3. The Opportunity Zone Program of 2017 
As part of the TCJA, President Donald J. Trump in 2017 signed into law 
the latest iteration of place-based investment tax incentives, designed for quali-
fied “Opportunity Zones.”83 Qualified Opportunity Zones are low-income 
communities, as defined under section 45D(e) of the Code, meaning popula-
tion census tracts with either a poverty rate of at least 20%, or metropolitan 
areas where the median family income does not exceed 80% of the greater of 
the statewide or the metropolitan median family income. 84 State governors 
nominate, and Treasury designates, Opportunity Zones for each state.85 The 
                                                                                                          
 82 See ALA. CODE § 41-9-219 (2020) (providing a tax credit in qualifying CDEs based on the  
federal NMTC program for investments); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 15-4-3601 to -4-3614 (2020) (same); 
FLA. STAT. § 288.9916 (2020) (same); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 141.432–.434 (West 2020) (same); 
LA. STAT. ANN. § 47:6016.1 (2020) (same); ME. STAT. t it . 36, § 5219-HH (2019) (same); MISS. CODE 
ANN. § 57-105-1 (2020) (same); NEV. REV. STAT. § 231A.200 (2020) (same). 
 83 I.R.C. § 1400Z-1; see Hemel, supra note 48, at 531 (describing Opportunity Zone provisions in 
the TCJA). The estimated cost of the Opportunity Zone program, at around $1.6 billion over a decade 
from 2018 to 2027, is low compared to past federal place-based investment tax incentives. Hemel, 
supra note 48, at 533, see also JCX-67-17, supra note 26, at 6 (projecting the budgetary impact of 
creating qualified Opportunity Zones). Because Treasury Regulations allow investors to benefit from 
the incentive until 2047, however, its revenue impact is largely unknown and will depend on the num-
ber of investors who participate in the program and the size of their holdings. See I.R.C. § 1400Z-2(c); 
Treas. Reg. § 1.1400Z2(c)-1(b) (2020) (allowing investors to exclude income from capital gains if 
they hold investments in qualified opportunity funds (QOFs) for at least ten years up to December 31, 
2049); see also EASTMAN & KAEDING, supra note 26, at 7 (arguing that the revenue impact of Oppor-
tunity Zone incentives is largely unknown). By way of comparison, Congress allocated $5 billion for a 
one-year extension of the NMTC. H.R. 1865, 116th Cong. (2019) (enacted as Further Consolidated 
Appropriations Act of 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-94, 133 Stat. 2534). The LIHTC also costs $5 billion per 
year and receives matching funds from tax-exempt state and local bonds as well as donations to chari-
table organizations. Orfield, supra note 5, at 133 (discussing the cost of the LIHTC). The federal gov-
ernment ultimately spent approximately $2.5 billion on empowerment zones during the program’s 
first  decade. Hemel, supra note 48, at 530 (comparing the cost of the empowerment zone program 
with that of the LIHTC). 
 84 I.R.C. §§ 45D(e)(1), 1400Z-1(a), 1400Z-1(c)(1). Certain low population tracts and rural coun-
ties also qualify. See id. § 45D(e)(4)–(5) (modifying the criteria for such areas). As of February 9,  
2018, Congress also considers low-income communities in Puerto Rico to be certified Qualified Op-
portunity Zones (QOZ). Id. § 1400Z-1(b); see also I.R.S. Notice 2019-42, 2019-29 C.B. 352 (expand-
ing I.R.S. Notice 2018-48, 2018-28 C.B. 9 to include Puerto Rico to list of QOZs); I.R.S. No t ice  
2018-48, 2018-28 C.B. 9 (listing the population census tracts the Secretary of Treasury designed as 
qualified Opportunity Zones). 
 85 I.R.C. § 1400Z-1(b); Press Release, Treasury, IRS Announce Final Round of Opportunity Zone 
Designations, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury (June 14, 2018), https://home.treasury.gov/news/p ress-
releases/sm0414 [https://perma.cc/9E45-BUT2]. Some areas that do not meet these conditions are  
nevertheless Opportunity Zones due to their proximity to low-income neighborhoods. I.R.C. § 1400Z-
1(c). Treasury imposes few restrictions on the nomination process, meaning governors use a wide 
variety of methods in selecting and submitting zones for federal approval. Rebecca Lester et al., Op-
portunity Zones: An Analysis of the Policy’s Implications, 90 STATE T AX NOTES 221, 223 (2018).  
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TCJA provides favorable tax treatment to taxpayers who invest in a “qualified 
opportunity fund” (QOF). 86 QOFs are investment vehicles in the United States, 
holding at least 90% of their assets in Opportunity Zone properties, and taxed 
federally as corporations or partnerships. 87 
Unlike previous place-based investment tax incentives, the TCJA does not 
offer a tax credit but instead modifies what counts as income in any taxable 
year. 88 Taxpayers receive preferential tax treatment on gains from the sale or 
exchange of capital assets when they reinvest those gains within 180 days in a 
QOF. 89 They can defer payment of any taxes due until they sell their holdings 
after the year 2047, thus decreasing the net present value of their tax liabili-
ties. 90 Treasury provides an additional reduction of 10% or 15% to their final 
tax liabilities if they hold their investments for five or seven years, respective-
ly. 91 If held for ten years, the taxpayers will owe no capital gains tax upon dis-
                                                                                                          
Selection methods vary from pro rata allocation of qualifying counties to the use of predictive analysis 
to choose areas for their economic potential. Id. 
 86 I.R.C. § 1400Z-2(d). 
 87 Id. § 1400Z-2(d)(1). Opportunity Zone property includes stock or partnership interests in an 
Opportunity Zone business and certain tangible property used in the trade or business of a QOF or an 
Opportunity Zone business. Id. § 1400Z-2(d)(2); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.1400Z2(d) (providing require-
ments for tangible property); Rev. Rule 2018-29, 2018-45 I.R.B. 765 (providing requirements for “origi-
nal use” and “substantial improvement” applicable to existing buildings and land purchased after 2017). 
A QOZ Business is any trade or business other than a “sin business,” or one leasing more than a de min-
imis amount of property to a sin business. I.R.C. § 1400Z-2(d)(3)(A); Treas. Reg. § 1 .1 400 Z2 (d) -
1(d)(4); see also I.R.C. § 1397C(b) (providing the definition of a qualified business entity). A sin  
business is “any private or commercial golf course, country club, massage parlor, hot tub facility,  
suntan facility, racetrack or other facility used for gambling, or any store the principal business o f  
which is the sale of alcoholic beverages for consumption off premises.” I.R.C. § 144(c)(6)(B).  In  
addition, at least 70% of a QOZ business’s tangible property is QOZ Property. I.R.C.  § 1 4 00 Z-
2(d)(3)(A)(i); Treas. Reg. § 1.1400Z2(d)-1(d)(2). Also, it must derive at least 50% of its gross income 
for each taxable year from trade or business in a QOZ. I.R.C. § 1400Z-2(d)(3)(A)(ii); see also Treas. 
Reg. § 1.1400Z2(d)-(1)(d)(1), -(1)(d)(3) (setting out further requirements under this provision). Fur-
ther, it  must use at least 40% of its intangible property in trade or business in  t he  QOZ.  I .R.C. 
§ 1400Z-2(d)(3)(A)(ii); Treas. Reg. § 1.1400Z2(d)-1(d)(3)(ii). Lastly, less than 5% of the average 
aggregate unadjusted bases of a QOZ Business’s property can be nonqualified financial property , 
subject to a working capital safe harbor. I.R.C. § 1400Z-2(d)(3)(A)(ii); Treas. Reg. § 1.1400Z2(d)-
1(d)(3)(ii). 
 88 See I.R.C. § 1400Z-2(b) (providing for deferral of gains invested in Opportunity Zone proper-
ty). 
 89 Id. § 1400Z-2(a)–(c). Without the provision, the IRS would include the gain on sale or ex -
change in gross income and levy taxes at a rate as high as 20%. Id. § 1(h). 
 90 Id. § 1400Z-2(a)–(b)(1); see also Lester et al., supra note 85, at 224 (discussing how the Op-
portunity Zone provision treats capital gains reinvested in QOFs). Specifically, the Code provides for 
a temporary deferral of income until the date of divestment, another gain inclusion event, or Decem-
ber 31, 2026. Id. § 1400Z-2(a)–(b)(1); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.1400Z2(b)-1 (p rov iding a  n o n -
exhaustive list  of gain inclusion events).  
 91 I.R.C. § 1400Z-2(b)(2)(B). QOF investments benefit from a step-up in basis equal to 10% of 
the deferred gain if held for five years and another 5% if held for an additional two years, up to De-
cember 31, 2026. Id. § 1400Z-2(b)(2). Basis is a number used to calculate the amount of taxable gain. 
SMITH & SMITH, supra note 41, § B260 (defining basis); see also I.R.C. §§ 1012, 1016 (providing for 
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position of their holdings. 92 The IRS does not cap the amount of capital gain 
invested or excluded, and taxpayers can self-certify their eligibility for the in-
centive. 93 Several states offer additional state and local tax incentives to Op-
portunity Zone investors. 94 
The Opportunity Zone program differs from the LIHTC and NMTC in 
three significant ways.95 First, whereas only investments in affordable housing 
qualify for LIHTCs, and the NMTC program requires that qualified low-income 
community investments make up the majority of a CDE’s investment portfolio, 
QOFs have few restrictions on eligible investments.96 QOFs can, for example, 
invest in residential or commercial property or in projects as diverse as start-up 
incubators or large infrastructure projects.97 Second, while CDEs must undergo a 
certification process to qualify for credits under NMTC provisions, QOFs self-
certify. 98 Third, funding for the LIHTC and the NMTC is subject to budgetary 
constraints.99 As a result, Treasury granted only a small percentage of applica-
tions from CDEs, approximately sixteen percent between 2003 and 2017. 100 
There is no analogous limit on funding for the Opportunity Zone program.101 
                                                                                                          
calculations of basis). Generally, the higher an asset’s basis, the less the taxpayer would owe in taxes 
upon sale of the asset. See I.R.C. § 1001 (providing for the calculation determining how much the gain 
or loss the federal tax system recognizes upon disposition of property). 
 92 I.R.C. § 1400Z-2(c); Treas. Reg. § 1.1400Z2(c)-1(b). 
 93 See I.R.C. §§ 1400Z-1 to -2 (providing no such limits); Treas. Reg. § 1.1400Z2(a)-1 to (f)-1 
(same); Lester et al., supra note 85, at 224 (describing the procedure for investor eligibility). Taxpay-
ers fill out an IRS Form 8949 and attach it  to the tax return of the taxable year they would have in-
cluded gains in gross income if not for the deferral. Treas. Reg. § 1.1400Z2(a)-1(a)(2); see also I.R.S. 
Pub. 550 (Mar. 28, 2019) (providing instructions to elect for deferral of capital gains investin g in  
QOFs).  
 94 LISA CHRISTENSEN GEE & LORENA ROQUE, STATES SHOULD DECOUPLE FROM COSTLY FED-
ERAL OPPORTUNITY ZONES AND REJECTS LOOK-ALIKE PROGRAMS 4 (2019). This includes Alabama, 
Arkansas, Connecticut, Louisiana, Maryland, Ohio, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin. Id. Other than Lou-
isiana, Maryland, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin, each of these states provide an additional state in-
vestment tax credit. Id. For example, Louisiana freezes property taxes in Opportunity Zones for up to 
ten years. Id. Maryland gives local municipalities the choice to offer additional property tax reductions 
to investors. Id. Rhode Island exempts capital gains from state taxation if the taxpayer invested the 
gains in an Opportunity Zone fund for just seven years, as opposed to ten years under federal require-
ments. Id. Wisconsin exempts an additional 10% reduction in state capital gains if the taxpayer invest-
ed the gains in a Wisconsin Opportunity Zone for five years, and an additional 15% after seven years. 
Id. 
 95 Lester et al., supra note 85, at 224, 226–27; see infra notes 96–101 and accompanying text 
(discussing the differences between the Opportunity Zone program and the LIHTC and the NMTC). 
 96 See Lester et al., supra note 85, at 224 (explaining how taxpayers participate in the Opportunity 
Zone program). 
 97 See I.R.C. § 1400Z-2(d) (providing requirements for QOFs); Lester et al., supra note 85, at 224 
(discussing the lack of restrictions on qualifying investments). 
 98 Treas. Reg. § 1.1400Z2(d)-1(a)(1); Lester et al., supra note 85, at 224. 
 99 Lester et al., supra note 85, at 226–27. 
 100 Id. at 227. 
 101 Id.; see I.R.C. §§ 1400Z-1 to -2 (providing no such limits); Treas. Reg. § 1.1400Z2(a)-1 to (f)-
1 (same). 
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B. Critical Assessment of Federal Place-Based Investment Tax Incentives 
Despite the early optimism surrounding place-based investment tax incen-
tives, even their initial supporters were aware that residents were at risk of dis-
placement as real estate and land values rose. 102 In the intervening decades,  
those who have studied place-based tax expenditures have questioned their  
effectiveness on several fronts.103 Subsection One discusses federal plac e-
based investment tax incentives and their uneven economic track record. 104 
Subsection Two describes the potential of collateral effects on communities.105 
1. An Uneven Economic Track Record 
Federal place-based investment tax incentives enjoy bipartisan support for 
delivering benefits to low-income communities by leveraging for-profit, mar-
ket-driven mechanisms. 106 The verdict is, however, decidedly mixed w hen 
evaluating these programs as anti-poverty measures.107 To what extent program 
benefits reach their intended recipients is unclear. 108 One study compared rent-
al costs in LIHTC-subsidized and market-rate rental units and found that about 
one-third of forgone tax revenue reaches low-income households in the form 
                                                                                                          
 102 See, e.g., WILLIAM F. MCKENNA & CARLA A. HILLS, THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’ S 
COMMISSION ON HOUSING 107 (1982) (supporting enterprise zones incentives but expressing concern 
about possible displacement of zone residents), Butler, supra note 52, at 47 (recognizing that the more 
successful the initiative becomes, the more likely it will displace those it means to help); Hall, supra 
note 52, at 12 (noting that because American policymakers intend to designate existing neighborhood 
communities as enterprise zones, the dangers of displacement will exist where none did under th e  
British model). Several proposals sought to salvage the approach as a solution to concentrated pov-
erty. See, e.g., MCKENNA & HILLS, supra, at 1067 (proposing measures to specifically address issues 
of affordable housing); Boeck, supra note 52, at 154 (detailing proposals in early federal enterprise 
zone bills to prevent displacement); Butler, supra note 52, at 48 (rebutting American enterprise zone 
critics who believe the only solution to avoid displacing local residents is to follow the British model 
of locating the zones in depopulated areas). 
 103 STEUERLE, supra note 1, at 205–06. 
 104 See infra notes 106–125 and accompanying text (discussing the economic impact of federal 
place-based investment tax incentives on racial segregation, gentrification, and economic growth). 
 105 See infra notes 126–150 and accompanying text (describing critiques of the effects of federal 
place-based investment tax incentives on racial segregation and gentrification). 
 106 See Layser, supra note 52, at 404–05 (describing the excitement among investors in reaction 
to new Opportunity Zone incentives in the TCJA); Layser, supra note 17, 757–58 (noting that federal 
place-based tax incentives have long garnered bi-partisan endorsement); see, e.g., Molloy, supra note 76, 
at 48 (stating that because of the NMTC, investment dollars are funding projects benefitting low-income 
communities); Top 25 Innovations in Government Announced, HARV. KENNEDY SCH. ASH CTR. (May 2, 
2011), https://ash.harvard.edu/news/top-25-innovations-government-announced-0 [https://perma.cc/
J8YF-L7EH] (declaring the Treasury’s NMTC program as one of the top twenty-five innovations of 
2011 in improving regional economic development efforts). 
 107 Neumark & Simpson, supra note 19, at 1279; see, e.g., Hula & Jordan, supra note 22, at 24 
(discussing the results from studies of the NMTC program). 
 108 See infra notes109–116 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of evidence showing that 
community residents are better off after the passage of the LIHTC and NMTC programs). 
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of rent savings. 109 These results suggest that developers and investors capture a 
significant majority of benefits in administrative fees and profits, thus undermin-
ing the program’s ability to deliver government expenditures to targeted popula-
tions. 110 Moreover, the LIHTC certification process requires developers only to 
report high-level figures on construction costs and not detailed breakdowns of 
payments to third-party contractors.111 The program is, therefore, vulnerable to 
further misappropriation through fraud. 112 
The NMTC program fares little better. 113 The IRS has not established pro-
cedures to measure whether the program improves the lives of existing resi-
dents. 114 As a result, when the CDFI Fund and pro-NMTC groups report positive 
numbers on job creation and retention, for example, the figures are often mere 
estimates or rely on survey results from third parties using a limited sample 
size. 115 Because Treasury also does not require CDEs to report how much they 
charge in fees or interest rates for NMTC-subsidized capital investments and 
loans, any assessment of the program’s ability to deliver benefits remains  in-
complete. 116 
                                                                                                          
 109 Gregory S. Burge, Do Tenants Capture the Benefits from the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit 
Program?, 39 REAL EST. ECON. 71, 95 (2011). The amount that low-income households would save 
on rent constitutes between 26.7% and 51.3% of the cost to governments to offer the tax credit. Id. at 
91. 
 110 Id. at 95. 
 111 GAO-18-637, supra note 7, at 37. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Compare U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-14-500, NEW MARKETS TAX CREDIT: 
BETTER CONTROLS AND DATA ARE NEEDED TO ENSURE EFFECTIVENESS 15–16 (2014) [hereinafter 
GAO-14-500] (noting that Treasury officials lack data on the fees and interest CDEs levy even though 
higher charges mean less investment reaches businesses in low-income communities), with GAO-18-
637, supra note 7, at 37 (discussing the LIHTC’s susceptibility to fraud due to incomplete reporting 
data from real estate developers). 
 114 See Hula & Jordan, supra note 22, at 26 (arguing that thus far, efforts to measure the impact of 
the NMTC do not ask whether the program “materially” improves the well-being of those living in 
low-income communities); see also INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEPT. OF THE TREASURY,  NEW 
MARKETS CREDIT 1 (2010) (explaining that Congress intended for the NMTC-subsidized investments 
to “result in the creation of jobs and material improvement in the lives of residents in low-income 
communities”). 
 115 See Hula & Jordan, supra note 22, at 26 (noting that no one has yet conducted a full evaluation 
of the NMTC, measuring social and economic returns, as well as positive and negative externalities); 
see, e.g., NEW MKTS. TAX CREDIT COAL., NEW MARKETS TAX CREDIT PROGRESS REPORT 7 ,  9 
(2019) (claiming that the NMTC program created 58,300 jobs in 2019 based on survey data from 74 
CDEs); MICHAEL SWACK ET AL., CDFIS STEPPING INTO THE BREACH: AN IMPACT EVALUATION—
SUMMARY REPORT 7, 10 (2014) (discussing methodology and limitations of research on the impact of 
CDFI lending and investment). 
 116 See GAO-14-500, supra note 113, at 16 (noting that so long as the CDFI Fund does not collect 
CDE disclosures on fees, interest, and other costs, the lack of data limits Treasury’s analysis of the net 
economic benefit to low-income businesses); CHARLES DELUCA ET AL., CONG. BUDGET OFF., THE 
NEW MARKETS TAX CREDIT: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 9 (2011) (observing that CDEs incur high 
transaction costs at the onset from merely setting up the legal entity). 
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Broader economic indicators also yield ambiguous results. 117 For exam-
ple, in one study, researchers observed rising home prices, lower crime rates, 
and more racially and economically diverse communities where there w ere 
LIHTC developments. 118 Yet, without the ability to study a true counterfactu-
al—meaning an alternative scenario in which these developments never oc-
curred—we cannot definitively attribute these results to the policy interven-
tion. 119 Indeed, several studies show that projects funded by the LIHTC and 
NMTC tend to crowd out unsubsidized development, which is to say, these 
projects may have happened even without spending taxpayer money. 120 Fur-
thermore, where one Texas researcher did manage to study a counterfactual 
over a relatively long period of time, any positive changes observed in home 
values, job quality, private-sector employment, and poverty rates were modest 
as to be statistically negligible. 121 
                                                                                                          
 117 See Hula & Jordan, supra note 22, at 26 (noting that studies have not shown that the NMTC 
substantially enhances the lives of residents in targeted communities).  Co mpare  Diam ond &  
McQuade, supra note 5, at 1065 (discussing study results showing that the LIHTC integrates commu-
nities, raises home values, and decreases crime and violence), with Eriksen & Rosenthal, supra note 
66, at 954 (explaining that LIHTC-subsidized units primarily benefit moderate, as opposed to low-
income, tenants and tend to crowd out other affordable housing developments), and Nathaniel Baum-
Snow & Justin Marion, The Effects of Low Income Housing Tax Credit Developments on Neighbor-
hoods, 93 J. PUB. ECON. 654, 665 (2009) (showing that LIHTC-subsidized construction tends to crowd 
out private rental construction, especially in gentrifying areas). 
 118 Diamond & McQuade, supra note 5, at 1065. Researchers here studied data from 129 counties 
from 1987 to 2012, including the location and funding dates of LIHTC projects, figures from home 
sales, and homebuyer race and income information. Id. at 1064, 1074. 
 119 See Joseph A. Clougherty et al., Correcting for Self-Selection Based Endogeneity in Manage-
ment Research: Review, Recommendations and Simulations, 19 ORGANIZATIONAL RES. METHODS 
286, 287, 291 (2016) (explaining that randomized experiments are the “gold standard” for makin g 
causal claims in which researchers are able to study counterfactuals). Another recent study of  the  
TCJA Opportunity Zone program on job growth recognized that “designated tracts [for preferential 
tax treatment] may differ systematically from those left undesignated” because of factors like gover-
nor discretion in selecting tracts “eligible to receive benefits.” Alina Arefeva et al., Job Growth from 
Opportunity Zones 8 (Feb. 1, 2021) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=364550 7 
[https://perma.cc/ZXS3-LMDA]. It attempted to control for these outside factors by “includ[ in g]  
many controls for fixed characteristics of tracts and perform[ing] a variety of analyses to address the 
concern.” Id. The study also compared its results to an approximate counterfactual date by “running a 
placebo test in which [it] pretend[s] that legislation for the [Opportunity Zone] program occurred [two 
years earlier] in 2015.” Id. at 15. Under these design conditions, the study showed that, from 2017 to 
2019, the program’s impact was geographically disparate, with metropolitan areas seeing employment 
growth at between 3% to 4.5% for low-skilled workers while creating no jobs in rural areas. See id. at 
2 (discussing the study’s results). 
 120 See, e.g., Diamond & McQuade, supra note 5, at 1113 (explaining that without the ability to 
study a counterfactual, researchers could not discount crowd-out effects caused by the LIHTC); Hula 
& Jordan, supra note 22, at 26 (noting that only by assessing a counterfactual can researchers rule out 
the possibility that the NMTC is merely shifting investments that would have occurred absent t he  
subsidy). 
 121 Freedman, supra note 75, at 1013. Here, the study took advantage of the NMTC’s threshold 
requirements for eligibility: communities must have at least a 20% poverty rate or a median family 
income not exceeding 80% of the greater of either the statewide or the metropolitan median family 
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The evidence further suggests that place-based tax incentives mainly ben-
efit high-income individuals. 122 The TCJA Opportunity Zone provision, for  
example, can structurally favor the wealthy by allowing taxpayers to defer or, 
in some cases, exclude income from capital gains. 123 That capital gains taxa-
tion is concentrated in top income brackets makes the structure of the incentive 
undermine vertical equity—either the state’s tax base shrinks or lower-income 
residents must bear more of the financial burden for government services.124 
And, because state income tax rates are already largely regressive, additional 
exclusions of capital gains from taxation further exacerbates this problem.125 
2. Collateral Effects on Communities 
Although it remains the most prolific driver of affordable housing con-
struction, LIHTCs have been the target of long-standing criticism from civil 
rights groups. 126 The LIHTC program subsidizes a greater portion of costs for 
                                                                                                          
income. See I.R.C. § 45D(e)(1) (providing eligibility requirements for the NMTC); Freedman, supra 
note 75, at 1002–04 (discussing the study’s design). Apart from these income requirements, adjacent 
tracts were otherwise similar. Freedman, supra note 75, at 1001. The study tracked neighborhoo d 
changes over the course of a decade in the 2000s. Id. at 1004. Comparing adjacent tracts falling within 
a narrow range of poverty rates or median family income allowed the study to infer causality between 
NMTC investment and community outcomes. Id. at 1001. 
 122 See, e.g., Sean Lowry & Donald J. Marples, Tax Incentives for Opportunity Zones: In Brief, 20 
CURRENT POL. & ECON. U.S. CAN. & MEX. 597, 607 (2018) (finding that investment credits and in-
centives, like the NMTC and the Opportunity Zone program, mainly benefit capital owners, rather 
than the residents of economically distressed areas targeted for investment). The design of the Oppor-
tunity Zone tax incentive further amplifies the inequitable distribution of benefits because, unlike the 
NMTC, there is no cap on incentives conferred and no mechanism to ensure subsidized projects create 
“community outcomes.” Id. at 607–08. Although President Donald Trump’s Council of Economic 
Advisers claims that the Opportunity Zone program stands to lift one million Americans out of pov-
erty, it  assumes that the tax incentive’s effects will be similar to those of the NMTC despite these  
significant differences in program design. THE COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, THE IMPACT OF OP-
PORTUNITY ZONES: AN INITIAL ASSESSMENT 25 (2020). Experts say that such a comparison is unwar-
ranted and believe such claims of poverty alleviation require “a big leap of faith.” Noah Buhayer,  
White House Draws Doubts with Claims of $75 Billion for Poor Areas, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 26, 2020), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-08-26/white-house-says-75-billion-going-to-poor-
areas-it-s-debatable [https://perma.cc/FG8Y-MAYT].  
 123 See I.R.C. § 1400Z-2(b)–(c) (providing treatment and deferral of capital gains); cf. STEUERLE, 
supra note 1, at 248–49 (noting that capital gains taxation primarily concentrates in high-income earn-
ing tax brackets). Vertical equity is otherwise known as progressivity in the tax system. Id. at 11. In 
this narrow context, the principle calls for greater tax liability to fall on those with more ability to pay. 
Id. A broader interpretation of vertical equity asks the government to provide more to those wit h 
greater needs. Id. 
 124 See STEUERLE, supra note 1, at 11, 248–49 (describing principles of vertical equity and ex-
plaining that mainly the wealthy pay capital gains taxes). 
 125 Cf. ELIZABETH MCNICHOL, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, STATE TAXES ON CAPI-
TAL GAINS 2 (2018) (describing the regressive nature of state taxation of capital gains). 
 126 Orfield, supra note 5, at 105–06. For instance, in 2004, in In re Adoption of the 2003 Low-
Income Housing Tax Credit Qualification Plan, plaintiffs brought suit in state court alleging that New 
Jersey state agencies violated the FHA by directing tax credits for affordable housing to poor, black 
2021] A State Response to Ineffective Federal Place-Based Investment Tax Incentives 1989 
projects located in high-poverty areas. 127 Because Treasury also limits the 
amount of LIHTCs awarded annually to each state, these projects may come at 
the expense of affordable housing construction in areas with higher median 
incomes. 128 The combination of these administrative procedures, in effect, in-
centivizes developers to cluster LIHTC projects in low-income areas.129 Due to 
intergenerational poverty and entrenched racial segregation, African American 
and Latino families make up a large portion of these communities. 130 Using 
data from the Department of Housing and Urban Development, researchers  
have shown that LIHTC units are located predominantly in poor minority 
neighborhoods. 131 The LIHTC program’s effect on racial segregation could, 
however, be overstated if white, low-income tenants are moving into the new-
ly-built units. 132 Nevertheless, because Treasury does not require reporting on 
racial or socioeconomic data about tenants who ultimately reside in subsidized 
units, we do not have a complete picture of the program’s effects on a commu-
nity’s racial composition. 133 
Critics also maintain that the arrival of investments subsidized with feder-
al place-based tax incentives coincides with the influx of high-income individ-
                                                                                                          
neighborhoods. 848 A.2d 1, 9–10 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004); see also Orfield, supra note 5, at 
138–44 (examining the case to highlight the tension between civil rights and state and federal low-
income policies). The FHA requires the federal government and any agency operating on its behalf to 
“affirmatively further” fair housing. 42 U.S.C. § 3608(d). The parties’ arguments illustrate a larger 
debate surrounding the effects of the LIHTC incentive structure. Orfield, supra note 5, at 104–05. On 
one side, the defendants were state officials who echoed traditional arguments supporting place-based 
programs. Id. at 140–42; see In re 2003, 848 A.2d at 14 (identifying parties to the case and their ar-
guments). They contended that poor neighborhoods, irrespective of racial composition, needed capital 
investment, and LIHTC-subsidized construction would provide much needed housing and revive the 
local economy. In re 2003, 848 A.2d at 14–15. On the other, the plaintiffs were public interest advo-
cates, including the Fair Share Housing Center for the NAACP, who asserted that concentrating feder-
al and state-subsidized low-income housing exacerbated conditions for racial segregation and concen-
trated poverty. Id. at 5–6; Orfield, supra note 5, at 138–39. The court ultimately found for the defend-
ants, ruling that state officials’ actions did not constitute a violation of FHA duties even if the en d 
result  was greater racial segregation. In re 2003, 848 A.2d at 19. As codified, the LIHTC program 
gives preference to low-income neighborhoods, requiring state officials to allocate credits based on 
criteria that ignore race. Id. at 20. Their decisions did not, therefore, constitute a violation of FHA 
duties even if the end result was greater racial segregation. Id. at 20–21; Orfield, supra note 5, at 143. 
 127 Layser, supra note 23, at 948–49. 
 128 Id. at  950. 
 129 Id. at 948. 
 130 PATRICK SHARKEY, STUCK IN PLACE: URBAN NEIGHBORHOODS AND THE END OF PROGRESS 
T OWARD RACIAL EQUALITY 3, 9, 29 (2013); see also Layser, supra note 23, at 916 (discussing how 
segregation before the FHA created long-lasting barriers to integration). 
 131 J. William Callison, Achieving Our Country, Geographic Desegregation and the Low-Income 
Housing Tax Credit, 19 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 213, 245 (2010); see also Layser, supra note 
23, at 927–28 (explaining the distribution of low-income housing projects). Developers have built  
43% of LIHTC-subsidized units in neighborhoods with over half of the residents representing minori-
ty populations. Callison, supra, at 245. This number rises to 60% for development in urban areas. Id. 
 132 Orfield, supra note 5, at 135–36. 
 133 Id. 
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uals to the exclusion and detriment of the poor.134 In the aforementioned Texas 
study of NMTC-subsidized investments, areas that saw decreases in poverty and 
unemployment rates also saw higher rates of household turnover.135 These re-
sults led researchers to suggest that a demographic shift partly drove the im-
provement, rather than any changes in the lives of existing residents.136 This de-
mographic change was the inward migration of more affluent individuals into 
the low-income community, displacing existing residents—otherwise known as 
gentrification. 137 Even discounting gentrification effects, the evidenc e also 
suggests that any new employment opportunities arising from NMTC-
subsidized investments primarily go to skilled workers outside of targeted poor 
communities rather than to existing residents. 138 
Recent studies, however, paint a nuanced picture. 139 One analysis found 
that inward migration of new residents and outward displacement of existing 
residents are not inextricably linked. 140 Medicaid claims data showed that low-
income children were no more likely to move out of New York City neighbor-
hoods experiencing an influx of affluent residents than children in neighbor-
hoods that remained economically stagnant. 141 The result remained unchanged, 
no matter whether the children lived in rent-controlled or market-rate hous-
ing. 142 Another study of U.S. Census Bureau data revealed that although in-
ward migration increased the likelihood that existing low-income residents 
                                                                                                          
 134 Layser, supra note 17, at 777. 
 135 Freedman, supra note 75, at 1013; see also supra note 121 and accompanying text (discussing 
results from one study showing modest improvements in home values, job quality, private-sector  
employment, and poverty rates in areas hosting NMTC-subsidized development projects). 
 136 Id. 
 137 Layser, supra note 17, at 777. 
 138 Matthew Freedman, Place-Based Programs and the Geographic Dispersion of Employment, 
53 REG’L SCI. & URB. ECON. 1, 13 (2015). In a study of all NMTC-subsidized investments through 
2009, targeted areas saw an influx of jobs that are mid-wage (paying between $15,000 and $39,999 
per year) and high-wage (paying $40,000 or more per year). Id. at  7. The number of residents em-
ployed within their communities, however, dropped, while the average length of their commutes rose. 
Id. at 7–9. These results led researchers to conclude that the existing low-income residents did not 
receive most of the newly created jobs from NMTC-subsidized investments. Id. at 9. 
 139 See infra notes 140–144 and accompanying text (discussing results from recent gentrification 
studies). Compare Quentin Brummet & David Reed, The Effects of Gentrification on the Well-Being 
and Opportunity of Original Resident Adults and Children 5 (Fed. Rsrv. Bank of Phila., Working 
Paper, No. 19-30, 2019) (discussing results and methodology from a study of the effects of gentrifica-
tion on communities), and Kacie Dragan et al., Does Gentrification Displace Poor Children and Their 
Families? New Evidence from Medicaid Data in New York City, REG’L SCI. & URB. ECON.1, 2 (2019) 
(same), with Freedman, supra note 75, at 1013 (arguing that because of higher household turnover, 
any improvement in economic indicators is partly due to the displacement of existing residents), and 
Layser, supra note 17, at 764 (asserting that, without mitigating protections for local residents, the 
likely outcome of gentrification is the loss of homes and employment to wealthier outsiders). 
 140 See Brummet & Reed, supra note at 139, at 6–7, 24–25 (defining gentrification and base 
measurements and providing study results); Dragan et al., supra note 139, at 2, 8 (same). 
 141 Dragan et al., supra note 139, at 8–11. 
 142 Id. at 4. 
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would leave the area, displaced residents did not find themselves in more im-
poverished neighborhoods or in a worse-off position than residents moving out 
of areas not experiencing demographic change. 143 To the extent that federal 
place-based investment tax incentives create spaces encouraging an inw ard 
migration of the affluent, their effects on existing residents may not be as dire 
as previously feared. 144 
Adding further complexity to the analysis is the relative paucity of accu-
rate longitudinal data to inform studies on gentrification. 145 Researchers must 
therefore rely on proxy data and make assumptions that have profound effects 
on study results. 146 For instance, to gain an accurate picture of displacement, 
studies must first identify neighborhoods that are, in fact, undergoing gentrifi-
cation. 147 However, a multitude of variables exists to serve as indicators of gen-
trification, ranging from the more intuitive to the more creative. 148 The variables 
researchers ultimately select determine the number and type of neighborhoods 
studied and the ability of these factors to accurately describe change.149 Even 
taking these ambiguities into account, any quantitative analysis will fail to ac-
count for the social and psychological ties people have to their communities or 
the barriers gentrification may impose on later housing prospects.150 
II. INEFFECTIVE FEDERAL PLACE-BASED INVESTMENT TAX  
INCENTIVES AND THE DILEMMA FOR STATES 
Given the equivocal performance of past place-based investment tax in-
centives, the question thus becomes how states respond when Congress enacts 
these expenditures. 151 Eighteen states choose to calculate their residents’ tax 
                                                                                                          
 143 Brummet & Reed, supra note 139, at 24–25. 
 144 See id. (discussing results from their analysis of Census Bureau data); Dragan et al., supra 
note 139, at 8–12 (explaining conclusions drawn from Medicaid data). 
 145 Sue Easton et al., Measuring and Mapping Displacement: The Problem of Quantification in 
the Battle Against Gentrification, 57 URB. STUD. 1, 11 (2020). Longitudinal data monitors change 
measured over time. Id. 
 146 Id. at 3. Proxy data are substitutes researchers use when direct measurements are unavailable. 
Proxy Data, EUROPEAN QUALITY ASSURANCE IN VOCATIONAL EDUC. & T RAINING, https://www.
eqavet.eu/eu-quality-assurance/glossary/proxy-data [https://perma.cc/Q47H-SEBG]. 
 147 Easton et al., supra note 145, at 3. 
 148 Id. at  3–4. The more intuitive indicators include proximity to downtown, low but rising medi-
an income compared to the area average, rising owner-occupied housing prices, or growing resident 
educational attainment compared to the city average. Id. The more creative ones include an area’s 
proximity to parks and other green spaces, whether it is experiencing an influx of resident artists, or 
whether The New York Times covered the area in a gentrification exposé. Id. 
 149 Id. at  3. Other issues with quantitative studies of gentrification include identifying displace-
ment caused by gentrification to the exclusion of other forces, creating spatial areas that circumscribe 
displacement, and overcoming the weaknesses in available raw data. Id. at 7. 
 150 Id. at 2. 
 151 See Mason, supra note 9, at 1278 (discussing the varying impact between states that adopt 
different definitions of income and the timing by which their tax code conforms with federal tax law). 
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liability based on a version of the Code as it existed at some point in time.152 
Under this fixed-date system, state legislatures must opt-in and amend existing 
state law to adopt provisions newly enacted at the federal level. 153 By contrast, 
the District of Columbia and eighteen states dynamically mirror federal up-
dates by using the most current version of the Code to calculate their residents’ 
state tax liability. 154 Under this system, when confronted with new additions to 
the Code, states must opt-out to selectively exclude federal provisions from 
applying at the state level. 155 States exclude, or “decouple,” from select federal 
tax provisions by requiring residents to add back federal deductions or exemp-
tions when calculating their state tax liabilities. 156 
Citing a dearth of favorable outcomes from past place-based interven-
tions, some states have chosen to specifically decouple from the most recent 
Opportunity Zone provisions contained in the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 
(TCJA). 157 Beyond concerns around its inefficacy as a poverty-reduction tool, 
                                                                                                          
For the seven states with no individual income tax, and the two states exempting wages and capital 
gains from taxable income, federal tax law has minimal impact on the state’s tax base. See FED’N OF 
T AX ADM’RS, supra note 12, at 1 (listing statutory tax regime by state); Mason, supra note 9, at 1314 
(discussing states that primarily raise revenue through sales and property taxes). The states with no 
individual income tax are Alaska, Florida, Nevada, South Dakota, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming. 
FED’N OF TAX ADM’RS, supra note 12, at 1. New Hampshire and Tennessee levy taxes solely on in-
terest and dividend income. Id. Five states have an individual income tax but choose to eschew federal 
definitions of income altogether. Id.; Mason, supra note 9, at 1278. Nonconforming states include 
Alabama, Arkansas, Mississippi, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. FED’N OF TAX ADM’RS, supra note 
12, at 1. Although these states do not use federal AGI or taxable income to calculate state taxes, they 
will often use federal calculations as a component of their tax regime. Mason, supra note 9, at 1278. 
For example, reported wages will take amounts from federal Form W-2, business income from federal 
Schedule C, and capital gains and losses from federal schedule D. Id. 
 152 FED’N OF TAX ADM’RS, supra note 12, at 1. These states include Arizona, California, Georgia, 
Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, 
South Carolina, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id. 
 153 Mason, supra note 9, at 1333. Static conformity allows legislatures to better consider the ef-
fects that changes would have on states but requires amendments to maintain conformity with federal 
legislation. Id. 
 154 FED’N OF TAX ADM’RS, supra note 12, at 1. These states include Colorado, Connecticut, Del-
aware, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New 
Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, and Utah. Id. 
 155 See Mason, supra note 9, at 1346 (using state legislatures with biennial sessions as an example 
of systems with significant limitations to pass tax legislation). States following both fixed-date con-
formity and dynamic conformity with federal tax law must have their legislature vote in favor of new 
federal tax credits before those credits can lower state tax liabilities, even if the provisions already 
reduce federal taxes their residents owe. See id. at 316 & n.210 (explaining that states generally adopt 
federal tax credits through specific state statutes); MINN. STAT. § 290.0671 (2020) (providing an  
earned-income tax credit as a percentage of income). 
 155 Mason, supra note 9, at 1341. 
 156 Id. at 1277. Most states, for example, require residents to add back any federal deductions for 
amounts paid to state and local taxes, as well as federal exemptions for interest income accrued from 
out-of-state bonds. Id. 
 157 GEE & ROQUE, supra note 94, at 3. Of the states conforming to federal definitions of income, 
only California, North Carolina, and Mississippi have opted out of the TCJA Opportunity Zone pro-
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federal place-based investment tax incentives also have the potential to shrink 
state budgets and constrain the ability of states to drive their own community 
development policies. 158 Decoupling from such provisions does, however, have 
some drawbacks.159 Section A of this Part examines the financial cost of adopt-
ing these types of tax expenditures into state tax law and the constraints  they 
impose on state policymaking autonomy.160 Section B considers the downsides 
of excluding federal place-based investment tax incentives from state tax law.161 
A. The Price of Conforming to Federal Definitions of Income 
All things equal, federal place-based investment tax incentives decrease 
government revenue by shrinking the tax base. 162 Like direct spending,  the 
                                                                                                          
gram. Id. The California state legislature let lapse a bill that would have incorporated federal law into the 
state tax code despite the Governor’s endorsement of the program. Laura Mahoney, Fellow Democrats 
Stop California Governor’s Opportunity Zone Push, BLOOMBERG TAX (Sept. 11, 2019), https://news.
bloombergtax.com/daily-tax-report-state/fellow-democrats-stop-california-governors-opportunity-zone-
push [https://perma.cc/N9YC-P29Z]. North Carolina specifically decouples from sections 1400Z-1 
and 1400Z-2 of the IRC but does offer a tax credit for rehabilitating railroad stations located within 
Opportunity Zones. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-130.5(a)(26)–(27) (2020) (providing that taxpayers 
must add back to federal taxable income any gain they would have included but for section 1400Z-2 
of the Code to determine state net income); H.B. 399, 2019 Gen. Assemb. (N.C. 2019) (enacted)  
(providing a tax credit to taxpayers with qualified rehabilitee expenditures of at least $10 million to 
rehabilitate railroad stations meeting certain requirements, one of which is its location in an Oppor-
tunity Zone). Hawaii offers state tax breaks only for investments in Opportunity Zones within state 
borders. S.B. 1130, 30th Leg. (Haw. 2019) (enacted). 
 158 See Mason, supra note 9, at 1289–94 (discussing the impact of the federal tax expenditures on 
state budgets and their ability to define state tax policy). Thirty states and the District of Columbia use 
federal AGI as the basis for their calculations, while six states start with the federal definition of taxa-
ble income. FED’N OF TAX ADM’RS, supra note 12, at 1. The states using the federal AGI as a starting 
point include Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana Iowa, 
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Misso ur i, 
Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Utah, 
Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id. The remaining states—
Colorado, Idaho, North Dakota, Oregon, and South Carolina—start with the federal definition of taxa-
ble income. Id. States using federal taxable income conform more closely with the federal tax base 
because the definition of federal taxable income accounts for below-the-line deductions. Mason, supra 
note 9, at 1276. Most states conforming with federal AGI are equally beholden to federal tax policy 
because they often allow their residents to take a standard deduction as defined at the federal level, 
and many have itemized deductions mirroring those on their federal tax return. Id. 
 159 See Erin Adele Scharff, Laboratories of Bureaucracy: Administrative Cooperation Between 
State and Federal Tax Authorities, 68 TAX L. REV. 699, 705–06 (2015); infra notes 190–205 an d 
accompanying text (describing the downsides of decoupling from federal place-based tax incentives 
and more broadly, federal tax law). 
 160 See infra notes 162–189 and accompanying text (discussing the fiscal implications of con-
formity and considering the tradeoff states make in regulatory independence when adopting federal 
place-based investment tax incentives). 
 161 See infra notes 190–205 and accompanying text (considering the drawbacks states face when 
decoupling from federal tax law). 
 162 See Surrey, supra note 3, at 725–26 (addressing a key criticism of tax incentives). The total 
value of all income, property, and wealth that a legislative authority decides to tax within its jurisdic-
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forgone revenue shrinks the public budget while subsidizing taxpayers to 
achieve social and economic goals. 163 How Congress sets its tax expenditure 
budget can also impact how much revenue state governments collect from their 
residents. 164 Although states have independent taxation power, they often “con-
form” to federal definitions of income and determine a resident’s total taxable 
income based on the figure calculated after federal exclusions, deferrals, and 
deductions. 165 Therefore, even if conforming states do not explicitly agree to 
subsidize federal place-based policies, they nevertheless forgo state tax reve-
nue because these federal tax expenditures have already reduced their  res i-
dents’ taxable income. 166 In the case of TCJA Opportunity Zone incentives ,  
because qualifying taxpayers may exclude capital gains from federal calcula-
tions of taxable income, they will also see a reduction in their state tax bill if 
they reside in a state calculating tax liabilities using federal figures. 167 
                                                                                                          
tion constitutes its tax base. SMITH & SMITH, supra note 41, § T225. When multiplied by the applica-
ble tax rate, this figure determines how much revenue flows into public coffers during each taxable 
period. Steven V. Melnik & David S. Cenedella, Real Property Taxation and Assessment Processes: 
A Case for a Better Model, 12 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 259, 265 (2009). Policymakers some-
times calculate the impact of tax expenditures using the assumption that an increase in  r evenue-
generating activity will prevent a reduction in the tax base. See Surrey, supra note 3, at 726 (arguing 
that if the government program does stimulate economic growth, then the effect on the tax base might 
be mitigated). Only an increase in economic activity as a result of tax incentives will prevent a reduc-
tion in the tax base. Id. at 726. 
 163 Surrey, supra note 3, at 706; see also Cheryl D. Block, Pathologies at the Intersection of the 
Budget and Tax Legislative Processes, 43 B.C. L. REV. 863, 875 (2002) (explaining that giving feder-
al tax breaks and spending federal revenue are effectively equivalent from a budgetary standpoint). 
Tax expenditures are a form of government spending that represent deviations from the general in-
come tax structure and can result in foregone tax revenue equal to or exceeding direct expenditures. 
Surrey, supra note 3, at 706, 711. A sample of taxes the government could have collected includes 
those incentivizing charitable giving ($183.4 billion), research and development ($69.8 billion), green 
energy ($21.2 billion), earning income ($366.5 billion), saving for retirement ($100.9 billion), and 
education ($91.4 billion). See JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, JCX-55-19, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX 
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2019–2023, at 20, 21, 26, 28, 30 (Comm. Print 2019) (providing 
total estimated expenditures for 2019 to 2023 for deductions for charitable deductions, credits fo r  
increasing research activities under section 41 of the Code, the energy credit, the earned income tax 
credit, individual retirement accounts, and credits for tuition for post-secondary education); Schizer, 
supra note 8, at 284 (providing a similar list using 2014 figures). These estimates are rough and do not 
indicate how much revenue Congress would save if it were to eliminate the expenditures because they 
do not account for the way in which different provisions in the Code affect each other. Schizer, supra 
note 8, at 284 & n.51; see also TAX POL’Y CTR., THE TAX REFORM TRADEOFF: ELIMINATING TAX 
EXPENDITURES, REDUCING RATES 21 (2018) (describing “interaction effects”). 
 164 See Field, supra note 9, at 536 & n.24 (noting that states have chosen to decouple from federal 
provisions affecting the taxable corporate income). 
 165 State & Local Taxation, supra note 29, § 56; Field, supra note 9, at 536–37. 
 166 See Mason, supra note 9, at 1292–94 (explaining that by adopting federal definitions of in-
come, states use their tax revenue to support the activities Congress had decided to subsidize). 
 167 See id. (describing the effects of tax expenditures on the tax base of states conforming to fed-
eral definitions of income). Although Alabama, Arkansas, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania do not gen-
erally conform to federal definitions of income, these states have chosen to specifically forego state 
tax revenue in order to subsidize the TCJA Opportunity Zone program. See FED’N OF TAX ADM’RS, 
2021] A State Response to Ineffective Federal Place-Based Investment Tax Incentives 1995 
As proceeds from income taxes make up a growing proportion of the tax 
base for many states, federal programs have become an increasingly costly line 
item in state budgets. 168 From 1975 to 2000, the proportion of personal income 
tax became the leading contributor to state treasuries, rising from 23.5% to 
37% of overall state tax proceeds.169 Few states routinely measure the cost of 
conforming to federal place-based investment tax incentives. 170 The cost of  
conformity, in general, can represent a significant percentage of a state’s over-
all tax expenditure budget. 171 And, although conformity with federal plac e-
based investment tax incentives may only comprise a small portion of overall 
state tax expenditures, states are also subject to fiscal pressures absent at the 
federal level. 172 Forty-four states and the District of Columbia have balanced 
                                                                                                          
supra note 12, at 1 (detailing federal starting points for the calculation of personal income t ax  by  
state); Mason, supra note 9, at 1293 (explaining that if a state imports federal tax expenditures in  
calculating its resident’s state tax liabilities, then the state forgoes tax revenue to subsidize the federal 
provision). Massachusetts tax residents do not benefit from additional reductions to their state tax bill 
as a result  of the Opportunity Zone program because the state adopts the federal definition of adjusted 
gross income as of January 1, 2005, before the enactment of the TCJA. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 62, 
§§ 1(c), 2(a) (2020) (providing that with certain modifications, Massachusetts gross income means 
federal gross income as defined by the Code as it  stood on January 1, 2005). 
 168 See WALTER HELLERSTEIN ET AL., STATE TAXATION ¶ 20.01 (3d ed. 2019) (explaining the 
changing composition of state tax bases); Mason, supra note 9, at 1293 (describing how states con-
forming to federal definitions of income subsidize federal tax incentives using state tax revenue). Only 
seven states levy no personal income tax; Alaska, Florida, Nevada, South Dakota, Texas, Washington, 
and Wyoming. FED’N OF TAX ADM’RS, supra note 12, at 1. Tennessee and New Hampshire assess 
taxes on interest income and dividends. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 77:1–:37 (2020); TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 67-2-102 (2020). 
 169 HELLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 168, ¶ 20.01. 
 170 See MICHAEL LEACHMAN ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, PROMOTING STATE 
BUDGET ACCOUNTABILITY THROUGH TAX EXPENDITURE REPORTING 3 (2011) (discussing the gen-
eral lack of rigorous reporting on tax expenditures at the state level). For example, of the thirty-seven 
states conforming to the TCJA Opportunity Zone program, only Georgia, Maine, Maryland, Oregon, 
and Wisconsin have calculated its cost to the state. See WIS. DIV. OF EXEC. BUDGET & FIN., DEP’T OF 
ADMIN. & WIS. DIV. OF RSCH. & POL’Y, DEP’T OF REVENUE, SUMMARY OF TAX EXEMPTION DEVIC-
ES 19 (2019) [hereinafter SUMMARY OF TAX EXEMPTION] (estimating that the Opportunity Zone pro-
gram will cost $10 million in 2019 with ongoing costs thereafter); FISCAL RSCH. CTR. OF THE AN-
DREW YOUNG SCH. OF POL’Y STUDS. AT GA. STATE UNIV., GEORGIA TAX EXPENDITURE REPORT 
FOR FY 2021, at 110 (2019) [hereinafter GEORGIA TAX EXPENDITURE] (estimating that the Opportuni-
ty Zone program will cost $15 million over three years); FED’N OF TAX ADM’RS, supra note 12, at 1 
(providing the list of thirty-seven states who conform to federal definitions of income); JOINT STAND-
ING COMM. ON TAX’N, DEP’T OF ADMIN. & FIN. SERVS., MAINE STATE T AX EXPENDITURE REPORT 
2020–2021 & MAINE TAX INCIDENCE STUDY 67 (2019) [hereinafter MAINE STATE TAX EXPENDI-
TURE] (estimating that the Opportunity Zone program will cost between $3 million and $5 million 
over two years); OR. DEP’T OF REVENUE RSCH. SECTION, STATE OF OR., STATE OF OREGON TAX 
EXPENDITURE REPORT: 2019–2021, at 31 (2018) [hereinafter OREGON TAX EXPENDITURE] (estimat-
ing that the Opportunity Zone program will cost $15.9 million over three years). 
 171 ARAVIND BODDUPALLI ET AL., TAX POL’Y CTR., STATE INCOME TAX EXPENDITURE S 3 
(2020). For instance, conforming with federal tax law makes up 85% of state tax expenditures in Cali-
fornia and Minnesota, and 72% in the District of Columbia and Massachusetts. Id. 
 172 Compare KIM RUEBEN & MEGAN RANDALL, BALANCED BUDGET REQUIREMENTS: HOW 
STATES LIMIT DEFICIT SPENDING 1 (2017) (describing the many antideficit provisions applicable to 
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budget requirements barring them from spending more than they collec t in 
revenue. 173 Here, statutes limit the legislature’s capacity to bridge any short-
falls in state budgets by issuing debt.174 Therefore, to continue conforming to 
increasingly expensive federal tax incentives, states must make the politically 
sensitive decision to either raise tax rates or cut spending. 175 
Moreover, states face additional uncertainties when deciding whether to 
opt-in or opt-out of federal place-based investment tax incentives. 176 Because 
the IRS does not comprehensively collect, track, or analyze data from any of 
its tax expenditure programs, states do not know whether place-based invest-
ment tax incentives have had their intended effect, nor how to optimize pro-
grams if they have not. 177 Whether the provision misappropriates revenue and 
how much relinquished revenue goes towards administrative costs are also un-
knowns. 178 Furthermore, proposed and final regulations for any given new fed-
eral tax provision may differ significantly, and this divergence can have major 
implications. 179 For example, as compared to the proposed regulations, final 
                                                                                                          
states), with Evan O’Connor, Note, Caught Off-Balance: How Implementing Structural Changes to 
State Balanced Budget Requirements Can Foster Fiscal Responsibility and Promote Long-Term Eco-
nomic Health, 56 B.C. L. REV. 351, 354 n.19 (2015) (noting that although many lawmakers have de-
manded a constitutional amendment to include a balanced budget requirement, the federal government 
is not subject to such a mandate), and Tara Golshan, House Republicans Are Voting to Make Deficits 
Unconstitutional After $1.5 Trillion Tax Cut, VOX (Apr. 12, 2018), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-
politics/2018/4/12/17216828/balanced-budget-amendment-trump-ryan-tax [https://perma.cc/3WFV-
3J6Q] (reporting on recent Republican efforts to pass a balanced budget amendment). 
 173 RUEBEN & RANDALL, supra note 172, at 1. 
 174 Mason, supra note 9, at 1308. 
 175 Id. 
 176 See Field, supra note 9, at 540–43 (explaining that a state’s tax base shrinks when it conforms 
to tax expenditures adopted at the federal level); Mason, supra note 9, at 1320 (explaining that decou-
pling from federal tax law provides states more fiscal stability because it minimizes their exposure to 
revenue disruptions resulting from new or amended federal tax expenditures). 
 177 STEUERLE, supra note 1, at 198; see, e.g., Stephanie Cummings, O-Zone Investment Numbers 
Could Be Vast Underestimate, TAX NOTES (Jan. 17, 2020), https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-no tes-
today-federal/opportunity-zones/o-zone-investment-numbers-could-be-vast-underestimate/2020/01/
17/2c2vn [https://perma.cc/L43J-7CS8] (noting that neither the IRS, nor any other official government 
body collects data on investments in qualified Opportunity Zones and that data from private third-
party sources may greatly underestimate how much money taxpayers are investing in qualified oppor-
tunity funds); Jad Chamseddine, Republican Senators Boost O-Zone Reporting Requirements, TAX 
NOTES (Dec. 9, 2019), https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today-federal/opportunity-zones/republican-
senators-boost-o-zone-reporting-requirements/2019/12/09/2b6gh [https://perma.cc/Y8R5-K4VB] 
(discussing a Senate bill mandating that the Treasury collects information on QOF investments). 
 178 See STEUERLE, supra note 1, at 198 (explaining that despite the reforms passed in 1998 seek-
ing to modernize the IRS, it  still lacks information systems to monitor outcomes of federal tax ex-
penditure programs). 
 179 See Mason, supra note 9, at 1294 (explaining that by conforming to federal tax law, states 
cede regulatory authority to Treasury); Stephanie Cummings, Final O-Zone Regs Include Several 
Taxpayer Wins, T AX NOTES (Dec. 30, 2019), https://www.taxnotes.com/taxpractice/opportun ity-
zones/final-o-zone-regs-include-several-taxpayer-wins/2019/12/30/2bq58 [https://perma.cc/24PW-
2021] A State Response to Ineffective Federal Place-Based Investment Tax Incentives 1997 
regulations for the TCJA Opportunity Zone incentive provided additional tax 
breaks to investor taxpayers. 180 Having made budget projections by relying on 
proposed regulations, conforming states could see an even greater decrease in 
revenue than they previously estimated as a result. 181 
Lastly, if federal tax incentives fail to show positive outcomes while pur-
suing goals in an area traditionally under state purview, issues of regulatory 
autonomy also arise. 182 Because their effects cascade beyond the impact on one 
                                                                                                          
KQW5] (discussing the differences between final and proposed regulations for the TCJA Opportunity 
Zone program). 
 180 See Cummings, supra note 179 (reporting on several rules in the final regulations treating tax-
payers more favorably than those in the proposed regulations). For example, final regulations allowed 
taxpayers to invest the total gains from the sale of business property into a QOF without waiting until the 
end of the year to offset gains with any losses from the sale of business property. DEP’T OF TREASURY, 
FINAL REGULATIONS ON OPPORTUNITY ZONES: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (Dec. 19, 2019 ),  
https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/Treasury-Opportunity-Zone-Final-Regulations-FAQ-12-
19-19.docx [https://perma.cc/DCK8-62XU] (providing that taxpayers can invest the entire amount of 
capital gains from the sale of business property without having to wait until year-end to calculate net 
amount after losses). Typically, gains on the sale of business property under section 1231 are calculat-
ed at the end of the year by offsetting any gains against losses on the sale of business property. I.R.C. 
§ 1231(a)(1). In the second version of the proposed regulations, the rule would have taxpayers wait 
until the end of the year to invest any gains into the QOF if they wished to benefit from the section 
1400Z-2 deferral because only then could the taxpayer determine total aggregate gains, if any, under 
section 1231. Investing in Qualified Opportunity Funds, 84 Fed. Reg. 18659 (proposed May 1, 2018) 
(to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1). Final regulations allow taxpayers to invest the entire amount o f 
capital gains from the sale of section 1231 property within 180 days from the day of sale or exchange 
of property without reducing the gains by any losses. Id. 
 181 See Field, supra note 9, at 540 (describing how modifications to federal tax law can reduce tax 
revenue); Mason, supra note 9, at 1308 (explaining that changes to federal tax law can substantially de-
crease state tax revenue); Samantha Jacoby, Final Opportunity Zone Rule Could Raise Tax Break’s Cost, 
CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Feb. 3, 2020), https://www.cbpp.org/blog/final-opportunity-
zone-rules-could-raise-tax-breaks-cost [https://perma.cc/YF9A-FEAK] (reporting on the potential for 
the final regulations to increase the cost of the Opportunity Zone tax expenditure). Of the remaining 
thirty-seven states conforming to the Opportunity Zone program, only Georgia, Maine, Maryland,  
Oregon, and Wisconsin have calculated its cost to the state, and no state has re-estimated their figures 
based on Treasury’s final regulations. See GEORGIA TAX EXPENDITURE, supra note 170, at 110 (re-
porting results prior to the December 2019 release of Treasury regulations relating to Opportunity  
Zone provisions); MAINE STATE TAX EXPENDITURE, supra note 170, at 67 (same); OREGON T AX 
EXPENDITURE, supra note 170, at 19 (same); OREGON TAX EXPENDITURE, supra note 170, a t  3 1 
(same). Seeking to decouple from the Opportunity Zone provision, the Maryland legislature proposed 
a bill after Treasury published the final regulations for the provision, and Maryland’s budgetary esti-
mates showed a total cost of $71.7 million between 2021 and 2025 to support the federal tax expendi-
ture. DEP’T OF LEGIS. SERVS., MD. GEN. ASSEMBLY 2020 SESSION, FISCAL & POLICY NOTE FIRST 
READER: OPPORTUNITY ZONE TAX DEDUCTION REFORM ACT OF 2020, at 1 (2020); see also S.B. 263, 
2020 Leg., 441st Sess. (Md. 2020). Because Maryland does not regularly calculate the cost of con-
forming to federal tax expenditures, state officials do not know how the estimate would have differed 
if calculated using proposed regulations. See MD. DEP’T OF BUDGET & MGMT., MARYLAND T AX 
EXPENDITURES REPORT 3 (2019) (noting that the state does not calculate the revenue foregone t o 
support federal tax expenditures). 
 182 See Mason, supra note 3, at 986, 992 (noting that Congress passes tax expenditures in several 
categories traditionally under state and local control, like housing, education, social services, health, 
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investor’s tax return, federal place-based investment tax incentives may dis-
place a state’s own efforts to stimulate economic growth.183 So long as federal 
tax incentives prioritize certain activities over others, they diminish a state’s 
ability to enact competing policies—even if the state’s lawmakers determine 
them to be in the state’s best interest or a better expression of voter prefer-
ence. 184 Consider the New Markets Tax Credits (NMTC). 185 CDEs funnel over 
half of their funds into commercial real estate. 186 The program’s design nudges 
CDEs to invest in commercial real estate at a higher rate than they would ab-
sent the provision because doing so allows them to more easily maintain their 
certified status with the Treasury and to continue profiting from fees and inter-
est charges.187 If states determine that these types of projects are ill-suited for 
their communities, given the size of federal incentives, they might not easily 
counteract this incentive effect with their own tax policies. 188 Insofar as states 
are more knowledgeable of the local determinants important to a community’s 
economic prospects, the displacement of state tax policy is all the more salient 
in the case of place-based incentives. 189 
                                                                                                          
as well as community development, and that these federal tax expenditures present specific federalism 
issues). 
 183 See id. at  993–94 (discussing federal tax expenditures and their crowd-out effect). 
 184 Id. 
 185 See Layser, supra note 52, at 414, 420 (using the NMTC as an example to draw a distinction 
between the economic and technical incidence of an indirect investment tax incentive). 
 186 GAO-14-500, supra note 113, at 4. 
 187 See id. at  16 (explaining the fees and compensation CDEs retain from NMTC transactions); 
Lauren Lambie-Hanson, Addressing the Prevalence of Real Estate Investments in the New Markets 
Tax Credit Program, 27–29 (Fed. Rsrv. Bank of San Francisco, Working Paper 2008-04, 2008) (dis-
cussing how the design of the NMTC creates incentives for CDEs to choose certain types of projects 
over others). Because “substantially all” of CDE funds must finance projects in qualify ing lo w-
income communities, the NMTC provision incentivizes CDEs to choose larger investments in com-
mercial real estate whose borrowers pay back the principle over a longer period of time—alleviating 
the need for CDEs to continuously scout for new sound investments. Id. at 27. In addition, real estate 
projects, unlike other more mobile businesses, cannot relocate out of a qualified census tract, thus 
decreasing the risk that the projects would “grow out of compliance” and require the IRS to recapture 
from investors any tax credits attributable to their financing. Id. at 28–29. 
 188 See Mason, supra note 3, at 993–94 (arguing that when the federal government uses tax ex-
penditures to influence taxpayer activity in areas traditionally regulated by states, states ar e co n-
strained in their ability to pursue competing policy goals). 
 189 See id. at  993 (quoting Justice Brandeis and noting that states can conceive of different solu-
tions to solve similar problems and serve as “ laboratories” for “social and economic experiments”  
(quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting))). See 
generally BARRY BLUESTONE, FED. RSRV. BANK OF BOS., WHAT MAKES WORKING CITIES WORK? 
KEY FACTORS IN URBAN ECONOMIC GROWTH 2–3 (2014) (discussing the local factors correlated with 
economic growth, such as transportation infrastructure, an educated workforce, variety of amenities, 
like restaurants and daycares, low crime rates, and business-friendly regulations and taxes).  
2021] A State Response to Ineffective Federal Place-Based Investment Tax Incentives 1999 
B. The Costs of Opting Out 
When decoupling from federal place-based investment tax incentives ,  
states could, at a minimum, risk signaling that they are unfriendly to business 
interests or uncommitted to community development. 190 What is certain, how-
ever, is that when the same income is subject to two different tax systems, the 
burden of compliance increases. 191 Taxpayers earning income in multiple ju-
risdictions cannot expect similar tax treatment across different states. 192 To 
illustrate this problem, consider the relatively simple example of taxpayers 
who reside in Michigan, a conforming state, holding an Opportunity Zone real 
estate investment in California, a nonconforming state, for ten years. 193 If 
Michigan taxpayers sell their California holdings, any gains would escape tax-
ation from both the federal and Michigan tax systems, while California would 
tax the profit at ordinary income rates. 194 In most other scenarios, taxpayers 
could expect to receive a Michigan credit for taxes they paid to another state 
on income from sources in that state.195 Here, however, taxpayers may not be 
able to claim the credit, as Michigan did not impose taxation by virtue of its  
conformity with the Opportunity Zone provision. 196 Outcomes become more 
                                                                                                          
 190 See Mason, supra note 9, at 1322–24 (discussing the positive and negative signals states send 
when deviating from federal tax law). Taxpayer unfamiliarity with a state’s motivations for decou-
pling is one explanation behind the power of such signaling. Id. at 1324. Taxpayers are likely more 
familiar with federal tax law and less likely to read state tax codes in their entirety, and likely do not 
seek to understand the legislative intent behind state statutory provisions. Id. As such, they are apt to 
infer broader attributions about a state government from deviations from federal tax law. Id. 
 191 Id. at  1279–80. Electronic tax return preparation may mitigate compliance costs but not elimi-
nate them entirely because taxpayers must still duplicate their efforts in tax-related recordkeeping and 
tax planning. See Scharff, supra note 159, at 706–07 (asserting that tax compliance costs from non-
conformity persist  even for wage-earning individuals with relatively simple finances); Lawren ce 
Zelenak, Complex Tax Legislation in the Turbo Tax Era, 1 COLUMB. J. TAX L. 91, 92 (2010) (noting 
that tax preparation software reduces the difficulty of applying tax rules but offers limited assistance 
in keeping records and entering data). 
 192 Mason, supra note 9, at 1282. 
 193 See BLAKE CHRISTIAN & EDVIN GIVARGIS, THE STATE OF OPPORTUNITY ZONE INVESTING: 
A POWERFUL FEDERAL PROGRAM THAT REQUIRES CAREFUL STATE ANALYSIS 2 (2019) (discussing 
the implications for state taxes for individuals investing in Opportunity Zones). 
 194 See I.R.C. § 1400Z-2(c) (providing for exclusion of capital gains from federal taxable income 
for investments held in QOF for at least ten years); CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 1 70 24.5 (20 20)  
(providing for fixed conformity of California’s definition of adjusted income with the definition con-
tained in the Code as it  stood on January 1, 2015 for taxable years beginning on or after January 1, 
2015); CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 17041(a)(2), (i) (providing the rates imposed on taxable income, 
defined as gross income less deductions “regardless of source,” with no preferred treatment for capital 
gains); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 206.2 (2020) (providing for dynamic conformity of Michigan’s defini-
tion of taxable income with the definition contained within the Code); Mahoney, supra note 157 (re-
porting on the California state legislature’s decision to allow a bill applying federal Opportunity Zone 
provisions to state tax rules to lapse). 
 195 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 206.255. 
 196 See id. (providing for a credit against taxes due to Michigan for taxes on income derived from 
sources outside of the state so long as the income is also subject to taxes in Michigan). 
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complex when considering the numerous combinations of state taxation regimes, 
provisions and conformity rules applicable to any given taxpayer.197 As a result, 
the cost of tax planning and compliance increases, and the lack of a unified tax 
regime creates barriers to interstate commerce.198 Compliance costs become 
even more relevant in light of the high rates of interstate migration and invest-
ment. 199 
More generally, states decoupling from federal tax provisions must also 
resort to their own legislative resources to administer their tax systems without 
the ability to leverage Treasury’s sophisticated rulemaking and enforcement 
capabilities. 200 Conforming states can refer to IRS liability assessments and 
federal court judgments. 201 These states also benefit by relying on the IRS to 
publish regulations and interpretive guidance. 202 State revenue departments can 
further harness federal expertise in drafting legislation and interpreting regula-
tions. 203 Conforming states can also make use of federal withholding, auditing, 
and reporting requirements to enforce state tax law. 204 In addition, information 
exchange agreements with the Service can also facilitate state-level enforce-
ment by keeping local tax authorities apprised of any federal deficiency rulings 
against their residents and allowing them to use the information filed in federal 
tax returns in their own audits. 205 
III. A THIRD WAY: EVALUATING FEDERAL PLACE-BASED  
INVESTMENT TAX INCENTIVES 
Part I of this Note shows that it is questionable whether federal plac e-
based investment tax incentives reduce poverty and deliver benefits to their  
                                                                                                          
 197 See CHRISTIAN & GIVARGIS, supra note 193, at 2–3 (asserting that the different combinations 
of state taxing regimes, provisions, and conformity rules could result in complex outcomes potentially 
catching taxpayers unawares). 
 198 Scharff, supra note 159, at 706. 
 199 Id. at 707. 
 200 Mason, supra note 9, at 1280–81; see also Scharff, supra note 159, at 706–08 (discussin g 
drawbacks for states decoupling from federal tax law). 
 201 Mason, supra note 9, at 1281. Some nonconforming states have established their own tax 
courts. Scharff, supra note 159, at 708; see DOUGLAS L. LINDHOLM & FREDRICK J. NICELY, COUNCIL 
ON STATE T AX’N, THE BEST AND WORST OF STATE TAX ADMINISTRATION 1–8 (providing an over-
view of states’ tax appeal processes and administrative practices). 
 202 Scharff, supra note 159, at 708. 
 203 Mason, supra note 9, at 1281. When state officials must develop their own knowledge base, 
they can also attend trainings organized by Treasury. Id. 
 204 Id. at 1280. Because state income tax rates are much lower than federal rates, the cost of tax 
enforcement to the state is also proportionally higher than to the federal government. Scharff, supra 
note 159, at 708. 
 205 Mason, supra note 9, at 1280–81. 
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intended beneficiaries. 206 These incentives further have the potential to segre-
gate communities and displace existing residents. 207 Potentially ineffective 
federal tax incentives also have important consequences for states.208 As dis-
cussed in Part II, federal place-based investment tax incentives can reduce 
state budgets and regulatory autonomy. 209 Nonetheless, conforming with fed-
eral tax law confers notable benefits. 210 Because of these tradeoffs, reflexively 
rejecting new federal place-based investment tax incentives may not be in a 
state’s best interest. 211 
Instead, this Note argues that federal place-based investment tax incen-
tives deserve special scrutiny. 212 That a state must opt-in or opt-out of these 
provisions does not obviate its responsibility to direct taxpayer dollars towards 
programs with measurable outcomes.213 Therefore, state legislatures should 
                                                                                                          
 206 See, e.g., Freedman, supra note 75, at 1013 (concluding that the modest growth from initia-
tives in Texas was concentrated in low wage jobs); see also supra notes 106–125 and accompanying 
text (describing results showing that economic gains from place-based incentives were negligible). 
 207 See, e.g., Callison, supra note 131, at 241–62 (explaining that results are mixed as to the ef-
fects of the LIHTC on the racial and socio-economic makeup of communities, and arguing that signif-
icant programmatic changes are necessary for the LIHTC to serve as a tool for desegregation); Freed-
man, supra note 75, at 1013 (attributing part of the improvements in poverty and unemployment rates 
in neighborhoods receiving NMTC-subsidized investments to gentrification because tho se same 
communities also saw higher rates of household turnover); see also supra notes 126–150 and accom-
panying text (describing the criticisms of place-based investment tax incentives with a focus on its 
effects on existing communities). 
 208 See, e.g., Mason, supra note 3, at 993–94 (discussing the crowd-out effects of federal tax ex-
penditures in areas traditionally under state regulation). 
 209 See supra notes 162–189 and accompanying text (discussing the price states pay for conform-
ing to federal tax law). 
 210 Mason, supra note 9, at 1280–82. 
 211 See id. at  1320–31 (explaining the disadvantages of and obstacles to decoupling from federal 
tax law); see also supra notes 190–205 and accompanying text (describing the costs to states of de-
coupling from federal tax law). 
 212 See infra notes 213–271 and accompanying text (proposing a framework for states to evaluate 
federal place-based investment tax incentives). 
 213 See FOUND. FOR STATE LEGISLATURES & NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, PRINCI-
PLES OF A HIGH-QUALITY STATE REVENUE SYSTEM 1, 14–15 (4th ed. 2007) https://www.ncsl.org/
research/fiscal-policy/principles-of-a-high-quality-state-revenue-system.aspx [https://perma.cc/3YVN-
MJ2H] [hereinafter HIGH-QUALITY STATE REVENUE SYSTEM] (discussing the reasons states need to 
maintain high-quality state revenue systems, which requires, amongst other things, regular considera-
tion of the costs and benefits of any tax incentive program). Thirty-four states and the District of Co-
lumbia have laws requiring regular evaluation of tax incentives, but these laws do not cover all types 
of tax incentives, nor do they guarantee that states use the analysis to inform their policy decisions. 
See PEW CHARITABLE TRS., HOW STATES ARE IMPROVING TAX INCENTIVES FOR JOBS AND GROWTH: 
A NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF EVALUATION PRACTICES 3–4, 7 (2017) (discussing the increasing 
number of states who have enacted laws requiring regular evaluation of tax incentives but noting that 
in many of those states, evaluations may be sporadic or fail to provide a picture of an incentive’s eco-
nomic impact). Compare ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-221 (2020) (providing for the establishment of 
a joint legislative committee to review individual and corporate income tax credits), with WASH. REV. 
CODE §§ 43.136.045(1), 43.136.055(1)(j) (2020) (providing for the review of tax preferences—
meaning any exemption, exclusion or deduction from the state tax base, state tax credit, deferrals, and 
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evaluate program features by asking several questions either before its adop-
tion or even after its effective date. 214 
First, states should determine how they will assess the program’s perfor-
mance. 215 Section A of this Part discusses the criteria by which states could 
measure success.216 Second, states should ask whether they can establish pro-
cesses to monitor and evaluate outcomes.217 Section B of this Part examines 
the aspects of the provision’s design necessary to implement these process -
es. 218 Third, states should ask whether the program generally represents sound 
policy and examine strategies to address any shortcomings.219 Section C of this 
Part considers issues of efficiency and equity. 220 
A. Measuring Performance 
Evaluating tax expenditures begins with measuring their economic inci-
dence—the extent to which affected parties are in a better position owing to 
                                                                                                          
preferential rate—at least once every ten years, in order to evaluate, amongst other things, the t ax  
preference’s economic impact). 
 214 See STEUERLE, supra note 1, at 198 (explaining that the IRS does not collect nor analyze data 
measuring the outcomes of federal tax expenditures generally); Neumark & Simpson, supra note 19, 
at 1279 (arguing that not enough is known about the effects of place-based policies from currently 
available empirical evidence); infra notes 215–220 and accompanying text (summarizing the three key 
questions state lawmakers should ask before adopting federal place-based investment tax incentives); 
see, e.g., Cummings, supra note 177 (noting the absence of official measures tracking the amount of 
capital gains escaping taxation through the Opportunity Zone investment tax incentive); c.f . U.S.  
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-12-208G, DESIGNING EVALUATIONS 4–5 (2012) [hereinafter 
GAO-12-208G] (explaining that the information gleaned from well-designed evaluations of govern-
ment programs can assist  policymakers in making resource allocation decisions and guide any revi-
sions to program design). Only states with fixed-date conformity can evaluate federal provisions prior 
to their inclusion in state tax law. See Mason, supra note 9, at 1276–77 (explaining the implications of 
dynamic conformity with federal tax law). 
 215 See BODDUPALLI ET AL., supra note 171, at 3 (noting that federal tax expenditure programs 
represent a significant percentage of state tax expenditure budgets); STEUERLE, supra note 1, at 198 
(discussing how the federal government has yet to institute systems and processes to measure program 
outcomes); see, e.g., supra notes 115–122 and accompanying text (noting that without the ability to 
study a counterfactual, researchers cannot definitively attribute any statistical improvements in the 
well-being of community residents to the existence of a place-based policy). 
 216 See infra notes 221–235 and accompanying text (arguing that states should mandate reporting 
requirements in order to assess the performance a federal place-based investment tax incentive). 
 217 See, e.g., Easton, supra note 145, at 11 (discussing the lack of longitudinal data that policy-
makers need to understand the effects of gentrification, if any); supra notes 108–116 and accompany-
ing text (describing how the IRS does not track to what extent benefits from federal place-based in-
vestment tax incentives ultimately accrue to the populations the program targets). 
 218 See infra notes 236–253 and accompanying text (arguing that states should administer federal 
place-based investment tax incentives in a way that facilitates evaluation of program outcomes). 
 219 See HIGH-QUALITY STATE REVENUE SYSTEM, supra note 213, at 10, 12 (examining issues of 
equity and efficiency in a tax policy context). 
 220 See infra notes 254–264 and accompanying text (discussing ways in which states could better 
ensure that implementing federal place-based investment tax incentives does not violate good t ax 
policy principles of efficiency and equity). 
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the preferential tax treatment of certain behaviors or activities. 221 By contrast, 
parties enjoying statutory or technical incidence are more simply those who 
see a reduction in their tax liability as a direct result of a law’s provisions.222 
States must be able to identify the economic incidence of a federal place-based 
investment tax incentive or otherwise resist implementing the provision in 
their state tax codes. 223 Only by measuring the economic incidence of a federal 
tax expenditure will states know who benefits from its adoption and to what 
degree. 224 Although Treasury can identify those taxpayers who are better off in 
terms of dollars saved on their tax liabilities, the IRS does not, however, meas-
ure the economic incidence of these provisions.225 Before states conform to a 
federal provision offering place-based investment tax incentives, they should 
be ready to fill this gap. 226 
First, certain tax incentives like the New Markets Tax Credit (NMTC) and 
the Opportunity Zone provision contained within the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 
2017 (TCJA) require taxpayer investments to pass through an intermediary 
entity before distribution to local businesses. 227 In this instance, states should 
                                                                                                          
 221 Linda Sugin, Tax Expenditures, Reform, and Distributive Justice, 3 COLUM. J. TAX L. 1, 19 
(2011). 
 222 Id. 
 223 See id. at 23 (arguing that governments should not adopt tax expenditures when decisionmak-
ers lack the ability to discern their economic incidence); supra notes 106–150 and accompanying text 
(discussing the lack of evidence showing that federal place-based investment tax incentives have a 
marked improvement on the lives of community residents). Charitable donation deductions are anoth-
er example in which the difference between statutory and economic incidence is evident. Lay ser ,  
supra note 52, at 413. Taxpayers who donate to a charity claim a deduction on their tax returns and 
thus benefit from its statutory incidence. Id. Charities, however, benefit from its economic incidence 
when donors decide to make higher contributions as a result  of the deduction. Id. 
 224 See Sugin, supra note 221, at 23 (arguing that if it  were impossible to measure a tax provi-
sion’s economic incidence, then policymakers should refrain from adopting that provision). 
 225 JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, JCS-7-93, METHODOLOGY AND ISSUES IN MEASURING CHANGES IN 
THE DISTRIBUTION OF TAX BURDENS 2–3 (Comm. Print 1993) [hereinafter JCS-7-93]. 
 226 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-21-30, OPPORTUNITY ZONES: IMPRO VED  
OVERSIGHT NEEDED TO EVALUATE TAX EXPENDITURE PERFORMANCE 15–19 (2020) (finding scant 
data available to evaluate the outcomes from the Opportunity Zone program and a lack of statutory 
authority to any federal agency to collect and evaluate such information for the purposes of reporting 
on the program’s performance); Burge, supra note 109, at 95 (arguing that the majority of the LIHTC 
program costs do not reach its intended recipients in the form of rent savings); Hula & Jordan, supra 
note 22, at 26 (noting that the Service does not inquire as to whether the NMTC actually improves the 
lives of residents in targeted communities); Sugin, supra note 221, at 23 (maintaining that policymak-
ers should not implement tax provisions without an accurate accounting of their economic incidence); 
see, e.g., DELUCA ET AL., supra note 116, at 1 (discussing the NMTC and noting that a program cost-
ing $5 billion per year with no systematic evaluation of outcome should give Congress cause for con-
cern). See generally supra notes 106–125 (discussing the mixed results from studies on the economic 
effects of federal place-based investment tax incentives). 
 227 See I.R.C. §§ 45D(a)(1), 1400Z-2(a)(1)(A) (providing for tax benefits when investing in quali-
fied CDEs in the case of the NMTC and in QOFs in the case of the Opportunity Zone program); see 
also supra notes 74–101 and accompanying text (discussing the operational rules for the NMTC and 
the Opportunity Zone tax incentives). 
2004 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:1969 
call for these entities to report the fees and interest rates charged to investors 
and local businesses. 228 Second, in the case of provisions like the Low-Income 
Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC), the intermediary certifies the total cost of a pro-
ject, and this cost may represent payments to multiple subcontractors.229 Be-
cause the size of the tax benefit is proportional to total certified costs, states 
should require these intermediaries to document a breakdown of costs. 230 
Third, when intermediaries choose which local businesses to subsidize with tax-
payer-funded capital, they should collect and report key metrics to states.231 Ex-
amples include hiring numbers and wages of low-income residents in the target-
ed area, and ultimately, whether these businesses succeed or fail. 232 Fourth,  
states should require intermediaries to disclose the location and type of projects 
subsidized in order to understand how a tax expenditure program impacts com-
munities. 233 In the case of residential housing developments, measuring econom-
                                                                                                          
 228 See GAO-14-500, supra note 113, at 16 (remarking on the lack of reporting requirements 
required from CDEs); Lester et al., supra note 85, at 224 (noting that QOFs self-certify by filling out 
and filing an IRS form with their tax return); Sugin, supra note 221, at 23 (calling on lawmakers to 
avoid adopting a tax incentive when they cannot assess its economic incidence). For example, alt-
hough the Treasury requires CDEs to disclose transaction costs, fees, and compensation to the local 
businesses they are financing, it does not collect, nor report on, the information contained in those 
disclosures. GAO-14-500, supra note 113, at 16. However, the more CDEs profit, the less likely that 
low-income communities benefit from the tax incentive program. Id. at 15–16. 
 229 See I.R.C. § 42(g) (providing that the LIHTC program awards credits based on a percentage of 
the qualified basis of each qualified low-income building); GAO-18-637, supra note 7, at 45 (finding 
that state agencies charged with allocating tax credits to projects rely on final developer cost certifica-
tions, and few require additional contractor-level breakdown of project costs). 
 230 See GAO-18-637, supra note 7, at 65 (concluding that Treasury’s cost-certification mandates 
do not sufficiently address the risk of fraud when contractors misrepresent project costs); Sugin, supra 
note 221, at 24 (arguing that if policymakers wish for a tax incentive to benefit certain people, they 
should know whether the incentive’s design misdirects the benefits to unintended third parties). The 
LIHTC does not require developers to report a breakdown of construction costs by individual contrac-
tor, and thus also invites developers to inflate costs in order to fraudulently obtain additional tax cred-
its. GAO-18-637, supra note 7, at 65. 
 231 See GAO-14-500, supra note 113, at 22–23 (noting that when NMTC-subsidized projects fail, 
it  minimizes the social and economic benefits of the program to communities, and calls on the CDFI 
to better gather data on distressed projects); Mason, supra note 9, at 1303–04 (arguing that states,  
being closer to targeted communities and stakeholders, are in a better position to address the infor-
mation asymmetries that make it  difficult  for governments to ensure tax incentives are having their 
intended effects). 
 232 See GAO-14-500, supra note 113, at 22–24 (noting that current NMTC reporting requirements 
do not fully capture each CDE’s project failure rate even as CDEs with financially distressed assets 
reapply for additional NMTC allocations); DELUCA ET AL., supra note 116, at 13 (recommending that 
Congress implement procedures to measure the employment and wages of low-income residents hired 
directly by NMTC-subsidized projects located in low-income communities). 
 233 Cf. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45152, TAX INCENTIVES OF OPPORTUNITY ZONES: IN BRIEF 
12 (2019) (criticizing the Opportunity Zone program for its lack of disclosures as opposed to those 
required for NMTC-funded projects). Although the NMTC requires CDEs to report this information, 
the Opportunity Zone scheme imposes no such requirement on QOFs. Id. For instance, less than half 
of qualified Opportunity Zone investment funds focus exclusively on a single state or city, with the 
remainder investing in cities across the country. See generally NAT’L COUNCIL OF STATE HO US.  
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ic incidence also requires demographic data of those who ultimately move into 
new units. 234 For, if indeed incentives like the LIHTC concentrate poverty in 
minority communities, then states should not only refrain from providing further 
subsidies in the form of state tax credits, but should also include racial and soci-
oeconomic integration as one key criterion in their allocation decisions.235 
B. Managing Assessment 
Tax incidence data from intermediary entities would allow state legisla-
tures to know whether the structure of the federal place-based investment tax 
incentive diverts the benefits of the program away from low-income communi-
ties. 236 Whether the program’s intended beneficiaries experience economic in-
cidence is a separate and more complicated question. 237 To answer this ques-
tion, states would need to monitor the economic well-being of low-income res-
idents over time to see whether these metrics improve as a result of  plac e-
                                                                                                          
AGENCIES, OPPORTUNITY ZONE FUND DIRECTORY (2019) (listing Opportunity Zone funds registered 
as of December 2019). This means, for example, that Louisiana residents can benefit from reductions 
in their state tax liability for contributing capital gains to Opportunity Zone funds investing in Texas, 
Massachusetts, or other states. See I.R.C. § 1400Z-2(a)–(c) (lacking any requirement that taxpayers 
choose funds that invest in their resident states); LA. STAT. ANN. § 47:293 (2020) (conforming to the 
state’s definition of adjusted gross income to that which is reportable on an individual’s federal in-
come tax return). 
 234 See Callison, supra note 131, at 245 (showing that 43% of LIHTC units are located in poor 
minority communities, a number rising to 60% in urban areas); Orfield, supra note 5, at 135–36 (con-
ceding that if poor white families were moving into newly constructed LIHTC un its,  t hen t he  
LIHTC’s effect in racially segregating communities would be overstated, but noting that Treasury 
does not collect data on the race of residents in LIHTC-subsidized housing); supra notes 126–133 and 
accompanying text (discussing the possibility that by way of design, the LIHTC harms the very indi-
viduals it  aims to help). 
 235 See Layser, supra note 23, at 948–49 (explaining that the combination of two factors result in 
the concentration of LIHTC development in poor communities: first, the LIHTC subsidizes a greater 
portion of projects located in areas with a high poverty rate or low median income, and second, the 
federal government limits the amount of tax credits it awards to each state); Layser, supra note 17, at 
754–55 (noting that not only do poor communities exhibit  dismal outcomes across economic an d 
social indicators, including high rates of crime and unemployment, but also that conditions of concen-
trated poverty in early childhood reduce the cognitive function and earning power of those who come 
of age in these neighborhoods and their children—irrespective of whether they later move to mixed-
income communities); Orfield, supra note 5, at 151–55 (arguing that FHA duties require allocation 
decisions to affirmatively further racial and socio-economic integration). In 2004, the NAACP sued 
New Jersey state officials for disproportionately awarding LIHTC credits to developments in minority 
neighborhoods in violation of the FHA. In re Adoption of the 2003 Low-Income Hous. Tax Credit 
Qualification Plan, 848 A.2d 1, 9–10 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004). See generally Orfield, supra 
note 5, at 138–44 (discussing the case and its broader implications on the state’s role in furthering 
racial segregation through the LIHTC program). 
 236 See Sugin, supra note 221, at 19 (explaining the concept of economic incidence); supra notes 
221–235 and accompanying text (discussing measuring economic incidence by way of data collected 
from intermediaries who influence the size of subsidized investments and to whom it flows). 
 237 Sugin, supra note 221, at 23. 
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based policies. 238 Gathering longitudinal data is essential not only to assess  
performance but also to ensure any improvements in observed metrics are not 
the result of displacing existing residents. 239 States often have better access to 
the relevant metrics, such as rates of employment and crime, levels of house-
hold income and educational attainment, as well as racial diversity. 240 States 
may, therefore, be in a better position than the federal government to analyze 
the effects of place-based tax expenditures. 241 Indeed, that place-based policies 
are location-specific inherently limits states’ ability to use studies of economic 
outcomes from tax incentives applied elsewhere to make decisions about the 
intervention’s fit within their borders. 242 
Seeking to causally link outcomes to policy interventions poses, however, 
several challenges. 243 At the onset, states should ensure that selected areas map 
closely to the geographic delineations in existing data sets. 244 Policymakers 
should also qualify areas for the tax benefit using a methodology that would 
permit later study of counterfactuals.245 That is, allowing researchers to com-
                                                                                                          
 238 See Easton, supra note 145, at 11 (noting that without longitudinal data, it  is impossible to 
truly measure the effects of changing neighborhoods on residents); supra notes 134–150 and accom-
panying text (discussing how the true effects of place-based policies remain unknown without  an 
understanding of the effects of gentrification). 
 239 See Easton, supra note 145, at 11 (noting that without longitudinal data, the question as to 
whether gentrification negatively impacts community residents remains unanswered); supra notes 
134–150 and accompanying text (discussing how and why policymakers are unable to determin e 
whether federal place-based investment tax incentives encourage gentrification or whether gentrifica-
tion is detrimental to community residents). 
 240 See Mason, supra note 9, at 1303–04 (noting that information asymmetries are smaller be-
tween states and their residents than between the federal government and citizens because states can 
more easily acquire information about their residents). 
 241 See JCS-7-93, supra note 225, at 2–3 (explaining that although data collection and analysis is 
necessary for a comprehensive understanding of a tax incentive’s impact on the economic well-being 
of targeted groups, the abilities required to undertake such a task are outside the Joint Committee on 
Taxation’s area of competence). 
 242 See Neumark & Simpson, supra note 19, at 1280 (questioning how applicable the conclusions 
from studies on place-based policies in one area are to another area, considering the geographical 
differences of the locales in question). 
 243 See id. at 1221 (noting that understanding the causal effects of place-based policies suffer from 
the usual limitations of econometric research, as well as some challenges specific to the type of analy-
sis involved); supra notes 106–150 and accompanying text (discussing the issues that inhibit a com-
prehensive understanding of the true effects of place-based policies). 
 244 See Neumark & Simpson, supra note 19, at 1222 (describing this unique challenge in studying 
outcomes of place-based policies). This issue first appeared in the study of enterprise zones. Id. One 
California place-based incentive program, for example, defined the boundaries for qualifying zones 
using street addresses, but data from the U.S. Census Bureau reflected metrics based on the contours 
of each zip code. Id. Although researchers were able to approximate performance within a zone, the 
state could have helped researchers minimize measurement errors had it prevented a mismatch in data 
sets. Id. 
 245 See id. at  1237 (describing one study in which researchers were able to study an approximate 
counterfactual because targeted tracts automatically qualified for the incentive based on  p over ty 
rates). 
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pare places similar in almost all respects except where some selected areas 
would have benefited from the tax expenditure. 246 One way to accomplish this 
goal chooses areas purely on a mechanical and non-competitive basis, based 
on a cutoff poverty rate from census data.247 Unselected census tracts nearby 
are more likely to resemble those areas chosen to participate in the program, 
allowing researchers to better attribute any improvements in economic well-
being to the incentive itself. 248 
After collecting the data, its continuous monitoring and analysis should 
not fall solely on the state’s tax collection and enforcement agency.249 Instead, 
the task of evaluation should also fall to the agency whose purview has a logi-
cal relationship to the metric states choose to assess performance.250 For ex-
ample, if Massachusetts wished to evaluate a place-based tax expenditure us-
ing employment rates, then the Economic Research Department at Massachu-
setts’s Department of Unemployment Assistance would likely have access to 
the necessary information and expertise to provide a more comprehensive 
analysis. 251 Alternatively, states could charge nonpartisan offices regularly 
                                                                                                          
 246 See Clougherty, supra note 119, at 287, 291 (explaining the concept of counterfactuals); Hula 
& Jordan, supra note 22, at 25 (discussing studies on the NMTC and concluding that without the abil-
ity to study counterfactuals, researchers are impaired in their capacity to definitively attribute econom-
ic outcomes to the policy intervention); see also supra notes 117–121 and accompanying text (noting 
that without a counterfactual, policymakers cannot definitively rule out crowd-out effects). 
 247 Compare Freedman, supra note 75, at 1001–02 (explaining the design of a study allowing the 
researcher to examine approximate counterfactuals because NMTC allocations are based on threshold 
poverty rates and median family income), with Lester et al., supra note 85, at 223 (noting that alt -
hough census tracts qualifying for Opportunity Zone investments must be below certa in in come 
thresholds, governors employ a range of factors in selecting areas for federal approval). 
 248 See Freedman, supra note 75, at 1001–02 (describing the program design of the NMTC which 
allows for the study of an approximate counterfactual). In the case of Opportunity Zones, state gover-
nors selected areas for a variety of reasons, even if poverty rates in those tracts are above the threshold 
under the tax provision. HILARY GELFOND & ADAM LOONEY, BROOKINGS INST., LEARNING FROM 
OPPORTUNITY ZONES: HOW TO IMPROVE PLACE-BASED POLICIES 10 (2018). A more mechanical 
approach also decreases the likelihood of selection bias skewing study results. See Neumark & Simp-
son, supra note 19, at 1237 (explaining that the mechanical nature by which Texas selected census 
blocks for a place-based intervention made it possible for researchers to construct an approximate  
counterfactual); see also Freedman, supra note 75, at 1001–02 (outlining the study design for th e  
Texas study). 
 249 See PEW CHARITABLE TRS., supra note 213, at 12 (recommending that the evaluating office 
should have the capacity to make actionable policy recommendations, the relevant experience in eval-
uating government programs, and a neutral, nonpartisan viewpoint); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFF., GAO-13-167SP, TAX EXPENDITURES: BACKGROUND AND EVALUATION CRITERIA AND QUES-
TIONS 29 (2012) [hereinafter GAO-13-167SP] (noting that the IRS may not be the most appropriate 
agency to evaluate tax incentives seeking to achieve outcomes outside its area of expertise). 
 250 See GAO-13-167SP, supra note 249, at 29 (recommending, at the federal level, a strategy of 
sharing the evaluation of tax incentives with related agencies). 
 251 See Labor Market Information, MASS. DEP’T OF UNEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE, ECON. RSCH. 
DEP’T, https://www.mass.gov/orgs/labor-market-information [https://perma.cc/L4U5-3LCQ] (describing 
the purview of the Economic Research Department within the Department of Unemployment Assis-
tance). 
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conducting legislative audits with assessing the incentive, as they do in states 
with robust evaluation practices.252 Before adopting a federal place-based in-
vestment tax expenditure, states should therefore consider whether these agen-
cies have the administrative capacities and the skill sets to conduct such as -
sessments.253 
C. Considering Efficiency and Equity 
Because federal place-based investment tax incentives yield uncertain 
outcomes, states should consider whether the provision’s design seeks efficien-
cy and curbs the revenue that states would stand to lose. 254 For instance, if the 
provision capped the aggregate amount taxpayers can claim or limited taxpay-
er eligibility, its design would constrain any resulting revenue loss. 255 Indeed, 
Congress has restricted the amount of NMTC allocations that the CDFI Fund 
could issue annually to CDEs. 256 By contrast, when investing in a fund qualify-
ing for Opportunity Zone treatment, taxpayers can defer or ultimately exclude 
an unlimited amount of capital gains. 257 Relatedly, states should also refrain 
from adopting any place-based provision before Treasury releases final regula-
tions so they can fully account for the law’s budgetary impact.258 
Furthermore, states should ask whether federal place-based investment 
tax incentives treat taxpayers equitably or whether benefits accrue primarily to 
the wealthy. 259 High-income taxpayers generally have the most to gain from 
                                                                                                          
 252 See PEW CHARITABLE TRS., supra note 213, at 12 (describing best practices for states when 
selecting the agency tasked with assessing program outcomes). 
 253 See id. (recommending that in order to produce actionable analysis for policymakers, states 
should give careful consideration to the agency tasked with evaluating tax incentives). 
 254 See GAO-13-167SP, supra note 249, at 11–12 (recommending that policymakers evaluate tax 
expenditures by weighing their costs against the benefit they provide to society); Layser, supra note 
17, at 789–97 (noting the dearth of empirical support for the belief that place-based tax incentives 
benefit  low-income communities and arguing that governments should eschew such interventions); 
see also supra notes 102–150 and accompanying text (assessing the outcomes of federal place-based 
policies and showing that results are mediocre at best). Tax expenditure programs are “efficient” when 
the benefits gained from the programs exceed their costs. GAO-13-167SP, supra note 249, at 11. 
 255 See GAO-13-167SP, supra note 249, at 27 (discussing the options that could limit revenue 
loss as a result  of a tax expenditure). 
 256 Lester et al., supra note 85, at 227. 
 257 Id.; see I.R.C. § 1400Z-2 (providing no limitations on the amount of capital gains taxpayers 
could exclude or defer when investing in an Opportunity Zone fund); Treas. Reg. § 1.1400Z2 (same). 
A floor could also serve to limit revenue loss by providing preferential tax treatment to taxpayers who 
invest only above specified limits. GAO-13-167SP, supra note 249, at 28. 
 258 See Mason, supra note 9, at 1306–09 (describing revenue disruptions at the state level result-
ing from new or amended federal tax expenditure provisions); see also supra notes 176–181 and ac-
companying text (arguing that because of Treasury’s actions, states do not have a clear understanding 
of the impact of the TCJA Opportunity Zone provision on state budgets). 
 259 See, e.g., Lowry & Marples, supra note 122, at 607–08 (explaining that capital owners benefit 
most from investment incentives and credits, like the NMTC and Opportunity Zone programs, rather 
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tax expenditures. 260 For federal place-based investment tax incentives, it is un-
clear whether better economic outcomes for low-income households offset the 
tax revenue relinquished to provide favorable tax treatment to wealthy individ-
uals. 261 States risk even higher chances of inequitable outcomes when incen-
tives reduce capital gains taxation because capital holdings are concentrated in 
the hands of the wealthiest households.262 Mitigating measures, however, could 
include a phase-out of state tax benefits as incomes increase or the elimination of 
benefits for income above a certain limit. 263 Therefore, states should be wary of 
federal place-based investment tax incentives without such provisions or include 
such measures themselves to limit the inequitable distribution of benefits.264 
Looking forward, the pace at which the federal government uses tax ex-
penditures to further economic and social policy goals is unlikely to abate.265 
State officials have, however, begun questioning the wisdom of reflexively 
adopting these provisions. 266 In California, the state legislature allowed a bill 
adopting TCJA Opportunity Zone provisions to lapse, despite gubernatorial 
                                                                                                          
than targeted low-income communities); see also supra notes 122–125 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the effects of place-based incentives on vertical equity). 
 260 Schizer, supra note 8, at 315–18. For example, in 2011, the top 20% of earners claimed 80% 
of the tax benefit from itemized deductions and over 60% of the benefit from exclusions. Id. at 315. 
 261 See Neumark & Simpson, supra note 19, at 1279 (arguing that for place-based policies, stud-
ies thus far have not yielded conclusive evidence of their ability to achieve stated goals); supra notes 
102–150 and accompanying text (asserting that it  is unclear whether federal place-based investment 
tax incentives have resulted in better economic and social outcomes for communities). 
 262 See STEUERLE, supra note 1, at 248–49 (discussing how reductions in capital gains benefit 
primarily the highest income brackets). 
 263 See Schizer, supra note 8, at 333 (discussing measures to limit tax expenditures that under-
mine vertical equity). 
 264 See generally GAO-13-167SP, supra note 249, at 15 (recommending that policymakers con-
sider issues of equity when evaluating a tax expenditure). 
 265 See STEUERLE, supra note 1, at 5 (discussing the preference of both political parties in the 
United States for spending through the tax code); Mason, supra note 9, at 1271 (arguing that because 
Congress is inclined to use federal tax law to regulate taxpayer behavior, the impact of federal tax law 
conformity on state regulatory autonomy will likely grow). 
 266 See, e.g., John Herzfeld, Maryland House Backs Decoupling from Opportunity Zone Law, 
BLOOMBERG L. NEWS (Mar. 12, 2020), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/tax/document/XATS
05U8000000?bna_news_filter=daily-tax-report-state&jcsearch=BNA%252000000170d07ad3adab
7fd67e7dea0001#jcite [https://perma.cc/NG33-QZF4] (reporting on the Maryland House of Delegates 
and their passing of legislation to decouple from the TCJA Opportunity Zone program); The 2019-20 
May Revision: Opportunity Zones, CAL. LEGISLATURE’S NONPARTISAN FISCAL & POL’Y ADVISOR, 
LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFF. (May 11, 2019), https://lao.ca.gov/Publications/Report/4038 [https://
perma.cc/ZDT4-8ETN] [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFF.] (recommending that the Califor-
nia state legislature reject conformity with the TCJA Opportunity Zone initiative). Federal officials, 
too, have called for reform with President Joseph Biden criticizing the scheme as having “failed to 
deliver” and proposing a review to ensure it clearly benefits low-income communities. The Biden Plan 
to Build Back Better by Advancing Racial Equity Across the American Economy, BIDEN HARRIS 
DEMOCRATS, https://joebiden.com/racial-economic-equity [https://perma.cc/W3RQ-KZR8]. 
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support for the initiative. 267 Likewise, in Maryland, a bill is winding its way 
through the State Senate and House of Delegates, seeking to make Maryland 
the first dynamically conforming state to decouple from Opportunity Zone 
provisions. 268 Whether Maryland and other states ultimately reject this and fu-
ture federal place-based investment tax incentives remains uncertain.269 Sizea-
ble budget shortfalls stemming from the coronavirus pandemic are, however, 
                                                                                                          
 267 Mahoney, supra note 157; see also S.B. 315, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019) (proposing to 
conform California tax law to Code provisions allowing for preferential tax treatment of gains invest-
ed in Opportunity Zones in the state). California Governor Gavin Newsom advocated bringing the 
state in closer alignment with the federal tax system as part of his 2019–2020 “California for All” state 
budget proposal. CAL. OFF. OF THE GOVERNOR, GOVERNOR’S BUDGET SUMMARY: 2019–2020, at 94 
(2019). Without legislation to bring California’s tax code in line with federal incentives, state resi-
dents who invest in Opportunity Zones will see their capital gains taxed at a little over 12%, leading 
some analysts to believe that the state tax would cancel out any reductions in federal tax liabilities. See 
2019 540 Forms and Instructions Personal Income Tax Booklet, CAL. FRANCHISE TAX BD., https://
www.ftb.ca.gov/forms/2019/2019-540-booklet.html#2019-California-Tax-Rate-Schedules [https://
perma.cc/Q4CV-P453] (providing tax rates on personal income for California residents); Capital 
Gains and Losses, Personal Income Types, CAL. FRANCHISE TAX BD., https://www.ftb.ca.gov/file/
personal/income-types/capital-gains-and-losses.html [https://perma.cc/L4MT-FRSM] (providing that 
California taxes capital gains as ordinary income); see, e.g., Joseph Pimentel, Opportunity Zo nes 
Could Flop in California, Officials Warn, BISNOW (Aug. 15, 2019), https://www.bisnow.com/los-
angeles/news/opportunity-zones/strong-unlikelihood-california-will-conform-to-opportunity-zone-tax-
advantages-100351 [https://perma.cc/V9FW-H9H7] (reporting on State Treasurer Fiona Ma’s efforts 
to bring California in conformity with the Opportunity Zone scheme so that the state capital gains rate 
would not offset investors’ potential savings in their federal taxes). California’s Legislative Analyst’s 
Office (LAO) considered results from the state’s past experience with the NMTC from 2003 to 2014 
and found that the tax expenditure had little to no positive impact on the income of low-income resi-
dents. LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFF., supra note 266. By examining the state’s current tax structure, 
the LAO concluded that any efforts to use Opportunity Zone incentives to fund affordable housing 
would further concentrate low-income households to high poverty neighborhoods. Id. It also found 
evidence suggesting that the Opportunity Zone program will ultimately be a windfall to investors. Id. 
The LAO further noted that the tax benefit introduced administrative complexities, and t he sta te  
lacked the necessary governance structure to provide oversight and ensure compliance. Id. 
 268 See FED’N OF TAX ADM’RS, supra note 12, at 1 (listing Maryland as a dynamically conforming 
state, that is a state where the state tax code references the most current version of the IRC); Herzfeld, 
supra note 266 (reporting on the bill’s passage in Maryland’s House of Delegates and noting that the  
measure now goes to the state Senate); Lauren Loricchio, Maryland Could Decouple from Federal Op-
portunity Zone Program, TAX NOTES (Mar. 12, 2020) https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today-state/
tax-preference-items-and-incentives/maryland-could-decouple-federal-opportunity-zone-program/
2020/03/12/2c8lf [https://perma.cc/2RAW-DDUU] (remarking that Maryland would be one of the 
first  states to decouple from the TCJA Opportunity Zone); see also S.B. 263, 2020 Leg., 441st Sess. 
(Md. 2020) (proposing that Maryland taxpayers must add back to their state tax liability any capital 
gains excluded under the federal Opportunity Zone scheme); H.B. 224, 2020 Leg., 441st Sess. (Md. 
2020) (same). 
 269 Compare Maria Koklanaris, LAW 360 TAX AUTH., Opportunity Zone Investors May See More 
State Tax Windfalls (May 1, 2019) https://www.law360.com/articles/1154835 [https://perma.cc/Q43B-
RP4G] (predicting that states will conform to the TCJA Opportunity Zone tax incentive), with Lor-
richio, supra note 268 (reporting on the Maryland legislature’s efforts in March of 2020 to reject con-
formity), and Mahoney, supra note 157 (reporting on the California legislature’s decision in Septem-
ber 2019 to allow the governor’s proposal to bring state tax law in conformity with the TCJA Oppor-
tunity Zone program to lapse). 
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in the offing, as is the pressing need to fund local recovery efforts.270 By imple-
menting this framework for rigorous program evaluation, states need not reject 
tax base conformity and all its attending benefits to better ensure these federal 
place-based programs bring economic benefits to communities in crisis.271 
CONCLUSION 
Federal investment tax incentives are here to stay. As with all tax expendi-
tures adopted at the federal level, states risk seeing their tax revenue shrink as 
a result of these tax breaks. States must therefore choose to either subscribe to 
the policy goals behind such expenditures or sacrifice the administrative con-
venience that comes with conforming to federal tax law. This Note synthesizes 
the scholarship on this issue and focuses the analysis on federal place-based 
investment tax incentives. It argues that past outcomes from these tax expendi-
tures are equivocal at best, and they cause states fiscal uncertainty while con-
straining their autonomy to drive community development tax policies. Yet,  
programs offering these incentives remain popular with Congress, and decou-
pling from federal law requires tradeoffs states may not be prepared to make. 
This Note, therefore, urges state officials to evaluate federal place-based in-
vestment tax incentives prior to adoption and offers a framework to assist their 
assessment. The framework first examines the law and asks whether its provi-
sions permit states to gather the information necessary to measure the pro-
gram’s performance. It then looks to states and asks whether they have the ad-
ministrative capacity to implement the processes required to monitor and eval-
uate outcomes effectively. Lastly, it considers whether the intervention follows 
principles of sound tax policy—whether it generates net benefits as a whole 
and distributes those benefits equitably. 
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 270 See NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, FISCAL SURVEY OF STATES: FALL 2020, at 52 
(2020) (showing that for fiscal year 2020, states saw a $12.3 billion decline in tax collection and pro-
ject an decline of $30.9 billion in fiscal year 2021 while, prior to the COVID-19 crisis, the state pro-
jected revenue growth of about 3% for both years); McKenzie Cantlon, Rainy Days Are Here: States Tap 
Reserve Funds to Plug Budget Holes, NAT. CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Jan. 11, 2021), https://
www.ncsl.org/research/fiscal-policy/rainy-days-are-here-states-tap-reserve-funds-to-plug-budget -
holes.aspx [https://perma.cc/N69B-RVPX] (discussing how state legislatures have resorted to tapping 
budgetary reserves when pandemic-related shutdowns reduced tax revenue. while the resulting unem-
ployment increased expenditures on social assistance programs); Anshu Siripurapu & Jonathan Mas-
ters, How COVID-19 Is Harming State and City Budgets, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS. (Jan.  1 2,  
2021), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/how-covid-19-harming-state-and-city-budgets [https://
perrma.cc/9L4F-UCXL] (asserting that the fiscal shock from the COVID-19 pandemic will rival that 
of the 2007-2009 Great Recession). 
 271 See supra notes 212–264 and accompanying text (proposing a framework for states to evaluate 
federal place-based investment tax incentives); c.f. GAO-12-208G, supra note 214, at  4–5 (explaining 
that comprehensive evaluation is the necessary first step to designing better public programs). 
 
 
 
